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The launch of the health insurance program Seguro Popular (SP) enabled all Mexican 
residents lacking employer-based coverage to enroll, for the very most part without any co-
payments necessary. This paper aims to evaluate whether this well-intended policy may have 
perverse impacts affecting household dynamics. More specifically, I will assess whether SP 
had any effects on the occurrence of home violence, opposing predictions from a bargaining 
power approach with those of the theory of male backlash. The gradual, quasi-exogenous 
rollout of SP on a municipality level makes implementing a difference-in-differences (DD) 
estimation strategy feasible, controlling for municipality-specific and time fixed effects (FE). 
This is done in practice by combining data containing information about families affiliated 
with SP with hospital discharge data including details on victims of home violence that sought 
medical attention at hospitals available from 2000-2012. Main regression results indicate that 
SP lead to small, but significant increases in home violence in line with a male backlash 
approach. Short-term effects for up to two years after SP introduction imply 0.05 additional 
incidents of home violence per municipality on average whereas estimated long-term effects 
(more than three years after introduction) are double in size. The results are robust to 
alternative specifications which suggests the absence of confounding factors. Interestingly, 
impacts are driven by the rich municipalities in Mexico. To understand underlying 
mechanisms, a complementary analysis on marriage and divorce rates was conducted. Results 
reflect a heightened degree of female empowerment and independence which supports the 
increasing impact of SP on domestic violence within a male backlash framework. To make 
sure that the detected effect on the occurrence of violence is not simply due to increased usage 
of medical services typically occurring when health care is provided freely, survey data from 
before, whilst and after SP rollout is analyzed. Corresponding results point to increases in 
home violence in rich municipalities, which is reconfirming the validity of the main results.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“One of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than 
their results.” 
Milton Friedman 
The direct and indirect impacts of violence against women account for substantial long run 
economic and social costs. When violence against women occurs, it is in most cases an 
intimate partner that is perpetrating the crime (United Nations 2015). As domestic violence is 
a global issue, prevailing in both rich and poor regions, Mexico is one of the countries where 
women are victimized especially frequently (United Nations 2010). At the turn of the 
millennium, it was estimated that around 2.5 per every 100.000 women fell victim to femicide 
in Mexico (SEGOB, INMUJERES, and ONU Mujeres 2017). Compared to European 
countries this rate is high and it has been drastically increasing since, reaching more than 
double the 2000 value by 2017 (The World Bank 2020). In the early spring of 2020, tens of 
thousands of women in Mexico failed to appear to their place of work in protest against these 
untenable circumstances. Whilst the death toll of violence against females is rising, exceeding 
10 victims daily, women demand action by the government (Averbuch 2020).  
 
In Norway, the government addresses this matter by regularly issuing a plan of action against 
home violence1 with the latest one being in force between 2014 and 2017. As such plan was 
lacking during the last years, a new one is in the works as of 2019 and expected to be 
published in 2020 (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 2020). The latest version of the action 
plan contained 45 measures (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet 2013). These measures fall 
into one of the following five categories: 1) Prevention and recognition, 2) Knowledge, 
competence and research, 3) Assistance and treatment for victims of home violence, 4) 
Criminal prosecution of perpetrators, 5) Coordination and cooperation between institutions.  
 
Besides its immediate negative impact, home violence can affect victims adversely in the long 
run as well. Using Dutch data, Bindler and Ketel (2019) address long run effects of violent 
victimization on labor market outcomes and find significant and persisting decreases in 
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earnings and longer durations of receiving benefits. Estimated effects of home violence are 
even more distinct than those of other types of violent criminal victimization such as assault 
or sex offences. Moreover, the consequences of violence are not only devastating for the 
direct victims and families, but it can hinder economic development and progress for whole 
countries. Even if impacts may be most severe for less developed countries, high income 
countries pay the exorbitant price of home violence, too. Estimates by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet) for 2012 
indicate costs due to domestic violence in Norway between 4,5 and 6 billion NOK 
(Rasmussen et al. 2012). Hence, it is of utmost importance to investigate and research impacts 
of public policy on the incidence of intimate partner violence and how interventions may help 
alleviate the victim’s burden.  
 
Due to both the difficulty in terms of reliably identifying and measuring incidents of domestic 
violence as well as the sensitive nature of the issue, researchers face serious challenges in 
accessing suitable data. As this area of research has gained attention lately, economic research 
on domestic violence is thus still underrepresented when compared to research on other 
crime-related topics. Therefore, my thesis is dedicated to adding to the literature by 
empirically examining the possible impact of the introduction of the universal health care 
program Seguro Popular (“People’s Insurance”, referred to as SP hereafter) in Mexico on 
rates of domestic violence.  
 
When universal health care becomes available, it can be suspected that power structures 
within households are impacted. In Mexico, the male tends to be the breadwinner of the 
family. Numbers from the OECD (2017) indicate that almost half of the households with both 
parents and at least one child present consist of an unemployed housewife and a full-time 
working man. This implies that many women were depending on their possibly violent male 
partner for health insurance prior to the introduction of SP. With SP in place, this constraint 
disappears as health insurance becomes available to everyone. The incentive to stay with a 
violent partner would then decrease, which in turn indicates a relatively more empowered 
female.  
 
According to this reasoning, I aim to answer the following research questions which form the 
basis of the main analysis: Does the introduction of SP measurably impact relationship-related 
female decision-making, which could be reflected by changes in marriage rates, divorce rates 
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or the composition of the couple? In the case of such changes being detected, do they imply 
increased empowerment on the woman’s part? Building on these issues, the primary research 
question of this paper will be whether relative increases in female empowerment caused by 
SP have the potential to induce perverse effects in the shape of increased domestic violence or 
if women become better off overall.  
 
SP was gradually introduced on a state level, starting as a pilot project in five states in 2002 
and reaching all municipalities by 2010. Besides a basic health package which was provided 
to the poorest within the means of the Oportunidades poverty alleviation program, health 
insurance had previously been employer-based and therefore only available to families with at 
least one formally working household member. Thus, SP offered coverage for all those 
citizens who were uninsured until then. Enrollment remained voluntary, and in practice free of 
charge for most households (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera 2013). By 2012, SP covered as 
much as 72% of the poor population in Mexico (World Bank 2015). Ten year after the last 
states had officially introduced SP in 2005, close to 50% of the total Mexican population was 
affiliated with SP (INEGI - Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografíca e Informática 2020).  
 
When crisis hits, the value of health care available to everyone becomes evident. During the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, many people lose their jobs on a global scale and there is thus 
a high demand for publicly provided health insurance. A large concern in times like these is 
that the circumstances of victims exposed to violence at home deteriorate. This could be the 
case because the time exposed to the perpetrator most likely increases due to measures of 
social isolation and because of increased levels of stress and frustration among household 
members. Indeed, the number of distress calls to domestic violence hotlines in Mexico 
appears to have doubled since quarantine measures were introduced (Mellmann 2020). 
However, this issue is a global one, just as home violence itself, and deserves the attention of 
high-income countries as well. Recent data from a British domestic abuse charity finds that 
killings tied to domestic abuse more than doubled during the COVID-19 lockdown so far 
(Grierson 2020).  
 
In Norway there also exists the concern of increases in home violence due to the COVID-19 
related lockdown of the country and the associated preventive measures stipulated (Elster 
2020). The number of calls to crisis hotlines actually decreased in Norway since the outbreak, 
which can possibly be due to the constant presence of the perpetrator at home (Myrvang 
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2020). Crisis centers do however expect drastic increases in reporting when restrictions are 
gradually relaxed, as seen in China. In the Chinese city of Jingzhou, the number of domestic 
violence incidents not only doubled, but it is estimated that the motive behind the abuse is in 
90% of the cases related to COVID-19 (Wanqing 2020).  
 
Returning to the case of Mexico, there exist theories that predict contradicting impacts on 
domestic violence levels when the female outside option is improved by policy such as SP. A 
bargaining power model which assumes a cooperative household solution made by utility 
maximizing household members forecasts a decline in violence, whereas a male backlash 
approach suggests an increase. The latter would hence indicate perverse effects of well-
intended policy. To address this, I use publicly available administrative data from Mexican 
hospitals between 2000 and 2012 containing narrowly defined information on each patient 
admitted. These details make it possible to identify victims of domestic violence with a 
reasonable degree of certainty. Combining this data with information on the timing of SP 
rollout in each municipality allows me to implement a difference-in-differences (DD) 
estimating strategy in an attempt to isolate causal impacts on domestic violence. The validity 
of this strategy relies on assuming parallel domestic violence trends across municipalities 
introducing the program at different moments in time in the absence of treatment. The DD 
strategy is implementable due to the fact that the unregulated SP rollout generated quasi-
random variation on a municipality level, on which the main analysis will be conducted.  
 
Estimated results imply a small but significant increase in intimate partner violence due to SP. 
Whilst this might solely be because of an increased usage of health services, as those become 
free of charge with the universal health insurance in place, survey data was examined to 
assess the validity of the results. Respective findings are encouraging and support the 
previous conclusions. In addition, I conduct a complementary analysis focusing on marriage 
and divorce rates. I do this in order to understand whether women behave in a more 
empowered manner, becoming increasingly independent from a male counterpart. Overall, 
results imply reductions in marriage rates due to SP as well as increases in divorce rates. 
Minor changes in the composition of the couples point to the same conclusion. This gives 
support to the underlying assumption about females becoming relatively more empowered 
which the main analysis builds on. 
 
The following thesis consists of seven main parts. I will start with giving an overview of the 
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background and introduction of SP as well as important connected topics of interest in chapter 
2. Subsequently, existing literature and theories addressing the issue at hand will be 
elaborated upon in chapter 3 and 4 before the data and estimation strategy will be presented in 
detail in the next two chapters. Estimation results are presented and discussed at full length in 
chapter 7. Chapter 8 will be dedicated to assessing the robustness of the main findings. The 
paper will conclude with discussing the implications of the findings overall and for further 
research in chapter 9. Concluding comments can be found in the tenth and final chapter of this 
thesis.  
Chapter 2: Background 
 
Considering the potential link between the health insurance program SP and domestic 
violence, there are several topics that need to be put in perspective in order to understand the 
supposed underlying mechanisms and related theories. As the “treatment” in this context is 
tied to the introduction of health care coverage for uninsured citizens, I will begin with 
elaborating upon the health care system in place prior to SP as well as the specific 
characteristics of SP itself. This is of distinct importance as it forms the basis for recognizing 
how a possible change in the power structure within households could arise. In chapter 3, 
which addresses relevant theory, this specific issue will be discussed in more detail. In 
addition, the preexisting situation in Mexico concerning cultural norms, criminal activity and 
especially domestic violence and the female standing in society is examined. I will conclude 
this chapter with giving a more detailed and concrete definition of female empowerment. This 
helps illustrating in what way the introduction of SP could alter the relative level of female 
empowerment which in turn strengthens the validity of the question of how changes in female 
empowerment impact the incidence of domestic violence.  
 
2.1 Health care in Mexico 
 
Universal health insurance is called upon as a main pillar for development and progress by 
economists (Summers 2015). Following the example of other Latin American countries such 
as Brazil, Chile and Colombia, which implemented health insurance reforms already during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s, the Mexican government made a step towards health insurance for all 
during the early 2000’s. In 2003, the Mexican congress passed legislation which ensured the 
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public health sector increases in funding by 1% of the GDP (Frenk, Gómez-Dantés, and 
Knaul 2009). The System of Social Protection in Health (SSPH) was simultaneously 
established with SP being its main feature. Hitherto, SP had only been run in selected states as 
a pilot program. It offered health insurance to all those without any prior form of coverage.  
 
Before the introduction of SP only about half of the Mexican population enjoyed the benefits 
of health insurance (Frenk et al. 2006). Health care coverage was generally employer-
provided, not unlike employer-sponsored programs in the United States, and covered 
employees as well as dependents. For workers in the private sector the Mexican Social 
Security Institute IMSS (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social) provides coverage financed by 
contributions of the employer, the employee and the state up until this day. The equivalent 
institution for public sector employees is the Institute for Social Security and Services for 
State Workers ISSSTE (Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios de los Trabajadores del Estado). 
Lastly, employees working in the oil and gas industry receive health insurance by PEMEX 
(Petroleos Mexicanos). Foreseeably, IMSS covered the largest share out of the three 
institutions before SP was introduced (Frenk et al. 2006). Health services for the insured are 
provided in public hospitals (Conti and Ginja 2017). However, private insurance and services 
in private facilities can be purchased in addition.  
 
Before the establishment of SP, around 50 million Mexican citizens were not covered by any 
of the above mentioned institutions (Frenk et al. 2006). Hence, according to the system of 
national health accounts during the mid-1990’s, over 50% of the total national health 
expenses were out-of-pocket expenses (Frenk, Gómez-Dantés, and Knaul 2009). Those 
remaining citizens, mostly poor and living in rural communities, would have the opportunity 
to receive medical attention by teams of medical staff who visited especially affected areas 
within the means of a program named PAC (Programa de Ampliacion de Copertura) (Conti 
and Ginja 2017). In addition, the poverty alleviation program Oportunidades (known under 
the name Progresa upon its establishment in 1997 and referred to as OP hereafter) provided 
direct cash transfers i.a. conditioned on attending health checkups for selected participants. 
OP is found to have had positive impacts on health outcomes among the poor. It has i.a. been 
shown that the birthweight of newborns among female recipients was significantly higher 




SP first came into play in the year of 2002. What started as a pilot scheme in only a handful of 
Mexican states eventually covered almost everyone previously uninsured in 2014 with 
enrollment remaining voluntary (Huffman and van Gameren 2018). The rollout of SP on a 
state-level between 2002 and 2005 was controlled by the federal government and targeted 
states with certain characteristics in regard to the timing of introduction. These characteristics 
are related to both capacity and potential for implementation as well as the demand for 
coverage. Early introducers were typically states with relatively rich municipalities that could 
provide the needed infrastructure. The funding of SP comes in large part from the federal 
government, which allocates means to the states in accordance with the number of affiliates, 
as well as from the states themselves (Huffman and van Gameren 2018). Therefore, states 
have the incentive to enroll their entire eligible population to expand their budget (Frenk et al. 
2006). As SP generally covers the less wealthy, families are in almost all cases excepted from 
co-payments (Bonilla-Chacín and Aguilera 2013). Hence, this source of funding is negligible 
in practice. When households, being the unit of enrolment, affiliate with SP they are allotted a 
health unit and GP and receive access to an extensive health package.  
 
2.2 Culture, crime and gender roles 
 
Mexico is a country still coined by tradition, cultural norms and religious customs. 84% of the 
Mexican population is affiliated with the catholic church (Willey et al. 2019). Couples marry 
earlier on in their lives than couples in other countries and divorce rates are astoundingly low 
(OECD 2019). Comparing the number of divorces relative to number of marriages per year 
across countries using statistics by the UN (2019), Mexico had a ratio of 0,15 (as of 2009) 
whereas Norway had a ratio of 0,44 (as of 2011). Pick, Contreras and Barker-Aguilar (2006) 
acknowledge that social practices and gender roles in Mexico place women in a position of 
subordination. Hierarchical structures within households are the consequence, with men 
exercising control and power over women. This contributes to a widespread machismo 
culture, where the male feels entitled to rule over his partner, predominant in many Latin-
American countries (Pick, Contreras, and Barker‐Aguilar 2006). Machismo culture may have 
been one of the reasons why it was not until 1997 that Mexican Congress passed the bill that 
declared domestic mental and physical abuse a criminal act (González and Maganda 2000). 
Divorce is frowned upon and considered a mortal sin by the catholic church. Social 
constraints do not grant women much independence in this respect either, which has 
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economic implications, too. Numbers by the OECD (2017) comparing how much household 
members respectively contribute to the shared income across countries exemplify this. For 
households with females aged 25 to 45 and at least one child present, almost 50% of Mexican 
households depend solely on the income of the male spouse. This share is very high compared 
to the other countries examined and accounts for less than 5% in Norway, where it is most 
common for both partners to work full time. The low female labor market participation for 
this subgroup of women illustrates the economic dependency on men, who tend to be the 
breadwinner of the family.  
 
Crime in Mexico is often tied to organized crime or drug trafficking where violent offenses 
are frequent. The homicide rate is among the highest in the world and has been increasing in 
Mexico since 2010, contrasting trends in most other Central American countries (United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2019). In terms of the occurrence of violence perpetrated 
by an intimate partner or spouse, a 2003 survey uncovered that almost 50% of all women 
above 15 years of age living with a partner suffer from domestic violence of some sort (Pick, 
Contreras, and Barker‐Aguilar 2006). Estimates from the National Survey on the Dynamics of 
Household Relationships (ENIDREH) in 2016 convey that 44% of women over 15 years of 
age experience intimate partner violence at some point in their life (INEGI - Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística Geografíca e Informática 2016). 
 
2.3 Female empowerment 
 
The expression empowerment is frequently used in different contexts and gladly employed to 
support all sorts of political or social agenda. However, a precise definition of what 
empowerment entails is often lacking. In order to grasp the context of the problem statement, 
different types of female empowerment are discussed in the following section.  
 
i. Types of empowerment and recent interventions 
 
Empowerment is generally defined by the Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2020) 
as “the process of gaining freedom and power to do what you want or to control what 
happens to you”. Mandal (2013) distinguishes between five different types of empowerment: 
social, educational, economic, psychological and political.  
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Female social empowerment addresses the common regard and standing of women in society. 
Social structures and norms may be considered rigid and hard to impact in the short run. 
Hence, social empowerment is difficult to impact directly through public policy. Economic 
and educational empowerment targeting females can be more directly addressed through 
intervention. As providing educational possibilities can act as a tool to increase the scope for 
economic independence in the long run, economic empowerment can be a consequence of 
educational empowerment (Mandal 2013). Contributing monetarily to a shared household 
income, employed females become more self-sufficient. At the same time, their intra-
household standing can be impacted. In terms of public policy, providing educational 
programs, job training or micro finance can act as a tool for governments to enhance female 
empowerment. Yet, also policies with other primary agendas, such as the introduction of SP 
in Mexico, can affect the power structure and economic balance between partners. Indirectly, 
the woman’s outside option is improved, leading to empowerment.  
 
Political and psychological empowerment are the remaining two types of empowerment. By 
actively getting involved politically, women seize the power that is given to them by law. As 
of today, it can be observed that women are disproportionally underrepresented in the political 
process (UN Women 2019). Psychological empowerment may be an important aspect in 
respect to domestic violence, especially in Western countries. When abuse is committed by an 
intimate partner, severe trauma is induced and self-worth and confidence suffer. These 
struggles are commonly accompanied by mental health issues. Victims may feel helpless, 
weak and unable to escape the toxic situation they are in. The process of regaining 
psychological stability and a feeling of self-worth may be important in terms of empowering 
victims of domestic abuse.  
 
Interventions on female empowerment are often multi-layered and address different kinds of 
empowerment. A recent measure includes a program in Uganda targeting young females 
evaluated by Bandiera et al. (2018). Within the scope of the program ELA (Empowerment 
and Livelihood for Adolescents), adolescent girls were offered vocational training as well as 
education about more general life skills including e.g. sexual and reproductive health. In 
addition, a mentor-system and regular meetings in groups generated a safe space to meet 
others and a sense of community. Findings of the evaluation of this policy imply increases in 
labor market activities, especially entrepreneurship, as well as reductions in early pregnancies 
and marriages among participants (Bandiera et al. 2018). Another intervention and 
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corresponding impacts are presented by Armand et al. (2018). They study the effects of 
allocating funds within the scope of a cash transfer program in Macedonia to the women of 
eligible households. In the case of the Macedonian program, it was randomly selected which 
household member receives the cash amount. The randomized nature of this approach makes 
it then feasible to identify possible differential effects of allocating the money to women 
instead of men. Armand et al. (2018) find that spending on food significantly increases when 
women were assigned cash transfers and that diets become more nutritious if initial levels of 
food expenditures were low.   
Chapter 3: Theories 
 
The problem that I aim to shed light on in this thesis covers the possible relationship between 
health insurance coverage and domestic violence. The suspected mechanisms at work 
establishing and impacting this connection are not straightforward. Yet, there exist two 
theories that can be directly applied in an economic context explaining why an impact of SP 
on domestic violence is possible and reasonable to expect. I will focus on and test these two 
theories, namely the bargaining power theory as well as the male backlash model. The two 
approaches acknowledge that household dynamics may change when SP is introduced, but 
predict contradicting effects on levels of intra-household violence. Which factors contribute to 
domestic violence is typically not a question answered by economists, but by sociologists and 
criminologists.2 Two angles evolving from research in these fields that can have relevance in 
the context of SP will be elaborated upon towards the end of the following section.  
 
3.1 Bargaining Power Model 
 
Evidence suggests that the way households consisting of several household members reach 
decisions cannot be described as simply maximizing collective utility (see e.g. Bobonis 2009, 
Schultz 1990, Thomas 1990). The allocation of resources will rather be determined by a 
process of bargaining where individual preferences will be integrated depending on the intra-
household decision-making power of respective household member (Majlesi 2016). The 
 
2
 In addition to exposure time being a relevant predictor of domestic violence (in line with the analysis by 
Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld (1999) discussed in more detail in section 3.3) Gelles and Straus (1979) review a 
range of contributing factors which form the basis of selected theories of violence. Such factors include high 
stress or frustration levels, attending to conflict exacerbating activities as well as psychopathology and the abuse 
of alcohol and drugs by the perpetrator.  
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bargaining power model is an intra-household model based on rational, utility-maximizing 
household members that incorporates exactly this. I will focus on the bargaining power model 
as presented by Aizer (2010) taking into account violence within the household. As both the 
male and female part of the household are trying to enhance their own respective utility, they 
are assumed to settle on a cooperative solution to ensure the sustainment of the common 
household. It is supposed that the male derives utility from exerting violence upon the female 
whilst she is negatively affected by it. Moreover, as standard economic theory implies, the 
level of consumption of each individual influences their levels of utility. More formally, this 
can be expressed in the following manner 
 
  	 ,  
  	 ,    
 
where  stands for utility, 	 is the consumption,  denotes safety and  represents violence 
against the female. In addition, both the male and female member of the household positively 
benefit from being in a relationship and creating a shared household together. This positive 
benefit exists both on a personal level in terms of increased economic stability and shared risk 
in case of economic shocks as well as a societal level, depending on how strict social rules in 
regards to partnership and marriage are. Incorporating this into the utility expression yields 
 
 	, ,  
  	 , ,    
 
with  implying a partnership. In this simplified model, the man is assumed to prefer a high 
level of violence at home, all else being equal. Yet, a level too high would lead to the women 
facing more disutility from violence than utility from the partnership. Leaving the relationship 
and choosing her outside option would then be the rational thing to do. The male should 
therefore choose the level of violence in a way that does not risk the woman leaving him. The 
area of a cooperative solution as well as the threshold values of tolerable violence levels for 




As the actual bargaining power of each household member can never be directly observed by 
the researcher, implicit exogenous changes of the intra-household power structure are usually 
considered in order to set changes in outcomes of interest into context (Majlesi 2016). With a 
more attractive outside option, women become relatively more empowered. With SP in place, 
women do not face the vulnerable position of not having health care coverage in case of a 
split from a partner previously providing employer-based health insurance. 
 





In such a situation, the women is in a position where she can more credibly threaten leaving 
the relationship due to violence, already at lower levels (Aizer 2010). This mechanism is 
visualized in figure 1, when the red horizontal line indicating that the violent relationship and 
the female’s outside option are equally beneficial to her is shifted upwards (implying lower 
levels of violence). The critical level of violence the woman is willing to accept decreases and 
the cooperative outcome from bargaining should lead to a level of violence lower than before. 
In other words, the female fallback position in case of a split improves which means that the 
area of bargaining depicted in figure 1 becomes smaller and the man has to adjust the level of 
violence in order to sustain the relationship. Overall, the bargaining power approach to 
domestic violence predicts that the relative increase of power on the woman’s part leads to 
lower rates of intimate partner violence within households. In respect to the introduction of 




3.2 Male Backlash 
 
According to Rudman (1998), the term backlash refers to penalties for counter-stereotypical 
behavior. Such penalties can impair affected individuals both socially and economically. In 
Mexico, traditional views on gender roles are still present and widespread nowadays. 
Empowered and independent female behavior could hence be considered counter-
stereotypical by many. When women improve their relative intra-household standing, e.g. by 
an increased income, new employment opportunities or an otherwise enhanced outside option, 
the man will consider his dominance over her in jeopardy according to the male backlash 
approach (Macmillan and Gartner 1999). Especially in countries shaped by conservatism and 
patriarchal culture, tradition and rurality, men could fear for their reputation and consider 
empowered women a threat to their intrinsic identity. Independent women, in the eyes of men 
or society as a whole, then violate a culturally imposed norm. The backlash approach 
consequently implies that the man will lash back at the woman and hurt her in order to restore 
order and keep her in place. Aizer (2010) acknowledges that this theory lacks a component 
accounting for a female rationality constraint as it would be rational to leave a partner if 
violence increases to intolerable levels. Victims of domestic violence may however feel 
trapped in toxic relationships, sometimes not even confiding in anyone. It appears uncertain 
whether behavior can be classified as rational under such conditions. Also, the threat of 
leaving the relationship will not be a credible one in settings were divorce is tied to social 
stigma and a deterioration in status (Chin 2012, Srinivasan and Bedi 2007). The introduction 
of SP could thus have perverse impacts, increasing intimate partner violence. 
 
3.3 Exposure Reduction 
 
In their analysis on the contributing factors to the significant decline in domestic violence 
between the 1970’s and the late 1990’s, criminologists Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld (1999) 
promote the theory of exposure reduction leading to decreases in domestic violence. This 
simple theory implies that violence will decline due to a reduction in the time spent together 
with the respective partner. The authors base this conclusion on that fact that domesticity 
declined during the same time period as violence rates fell. Participating more in the labor 
force, women became economically more independent. The theory of exposure reduction is 
often implicitly talked about when the prominent topic of domestic violence occurrence 
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during holiday seasons is discussed. Boutilier et al. (2017) assert that professional sporting 
events, summer months as well as certain holidays correlate with higher rates of domestic 
violence using data from Calgary, Canada. In general, it yet remains uncertain whether the 
mere exposure or other triggers that coincide with such events, such as increased stress levels 
and frustration, are the cause for this. Dahl and Card (2011) examine the latter factors by 
analyzing the real-time impact of football match results on home violence. They find that 
unexpected losses of the favored team lead to a 10% increase in reported home violence. The 
theory of exposure reduction will not be examined in further detail in the context of this thesis 
as I do not have information on the relevant variables. It is however impossible to completely 
negate that this approach may be relevant, also in the case of the SP introduction in Mexico. 
The reason for this it that SP may have changed incentives to participate in the labor market, 
as described in more detail in section 3.4 that follows. In addition to substituting formal for 
informal employment, the possibility of some citizens completely dropping out of the labor 
force cannot be excluded. Hence, exposure may increase due to SP which in turn may lead to 
higher levels of domestic violence within Mexican households.   
 
3.4 Labor market informality  
 
Another angle on the issue of changes in domestic violence related to SP stands in connection 
with incentives to participate in the formal labor force. As highlighted by Wagstaff and 
Manachotphong (2012), introducing universal health insurance has the potential to distort 
labor market decision in favor of informal employment. This is an undesirable effect in itself 
if informality is associated with tax evasive behavior. With respect to the incidence of 
domestic violence it also appears possible that the mode of employment in itself could 
represent a predicting factor. Since informal work arrangements can result in monetary 
instability and heightened stress levels, SP may reinforce already existing issues at home. 
Another possibility is that men that previously were formally employed find their way into 
self-employment more frequently when SP is introduced. Freelance work could then result in 
more hours spent at home and hence more exposure time. Besides the pure time spent 
together, the fact that work-related stress is introduced into the living place could contribute to 
making matters worse for abused women. Yet, as I will elaborate upon in the next chapter, 
research on the effects of SP on informality only find small impacts, if any. Whilst there will 
be no further specific focus on this approach, its potential relevance cannot be excluded.  
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Chapter 4: Literature Review 
 
There exists little empirical research in the field of economics which tries to investigate 
mechanisms tied to domestic violence that are strictly comparable to the suspected effects at 
play in the context of this paper on Mexico. Reviewing relevant literature is dealt with in 
sequences. This way I aim to connect the relevant puzzle pieces of carried out research in 
order to reach reasonable assumptions about prevalent impacts of SP. Firstly, literature on the 
introduction of universal health insurance will be addressed. As SP ensures that everyone 
without previous coverage has the opportunity to enroll, it can in its essence be categorized as 
universal health care for the Mexican population. The research focusses mainly on health 
impacts, yet also illustrates and addresses possible issues that can arise whilst trying to 
estimate causal effects. Subsequently, I will focus more specifically on the existing research 
on the impacts of SP. As in the general literature on health insurance coverage, direct health 
effects are of specific interest when researching SP’s impacts. Yet, matters related to effects 
on the labor market and informality may be relevant for the problem statement at hand, too. 
Eventually, the existing literature on domestic violence will be elaborated upon, 
differentiating based on the specific setting of the respective paper. I do this because the 
external validity of any findings rests on the comparability between households examined. As 
it is reasonable to assume that both culture and family dynamics differ immensely across 
countries, I sum up results from western countries as well as developing and threshold 
countries separately. Emerging patterns within these two groups will be described eventually. 
Another approach that could have been chosen instead would have entailed to distinguish 
between the estimated effects of different kinds of policies and interventions. This is due to 
the fact that not only the observation units of analysis may differ significantly, impacting 
estimated effects, but also the types of intervention.  
 
4.1 Universal health insurance (UHI) 
 
There exists a variety of academic papers that are dedicated to evaluating the impact of 
expanding health care coverage in various settings. Famous ones on the RAND (Brook et al. 
1983, Aron-Dine, Einav, and Finkelstein 2013) or the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment 
(Finkelstein et al. 2012) are based on a RCT (randomized control trial) strategy and dedicated 
to analyzing effects on mostly self-assessed health outcomes as well as health service 
utilization. Whereas the utilization of medical services as well as total expenditures tend to 
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increase when UHI is introduced, direct effects on health are often negligible or hard to 
identify, presumably in part because data only covers limited time spans. Evidence which 
actually points to improvements in both physical and psychological health comes from 
Finkelstein et al. (2012) and Baicker et al. (2013) examining an expansion of Medicaid3.  
 
Two Latin American countries that introduced UHI programs resembling the basic concept of 
SP are Colombia and Peru. One difference to SP is that both programs determine eligibility 
based on a threshold value of the index of wealth. Evaluating the impacts of these insurance 
schemes using a regression discontinuity design, which compares observations right below 
and above the cutoff index value, is then viable. Doing so, Miller, Pinto and Vera-Hernandez 
(2013) find that the Colombian program (Régimen Subsidiado) not only shields from financial 
distress and increases preventive usage of services, but leads to significant health 
improvements for children. Following a similar approach for the case of Peru, Bernal, Carpio 
and Klein (2017) conclude that the Peruvian program Seguro Integral de Salud increased the 
propensity of people receiving medicines, visiting hospitals and having medical analysis 
performed. They take this as evidence that the insurance contributed to a heightened sense of 
awareness amongst the population in regards to health issues leading to an increased 
willingness to pay for medical services overall (Bernal, Carpio, and Klein 2017).  
 
A recurring concern tied to UHI is that guaranteeing health care coverage may lead to skewed 
incentives. On one hand there exists the danger of moral hazard described in detail by Einav 
and Finkelstein (2018). On the other hand, labor market decisions may be impacted when 
insurance previously was tied to a formal employer, especially in less developed countries 
with a large informal sector. Individuals may hence substitute informal work for formal 
employment. Testing this hypothesis for the case of Vietnam where UHI was rolled out 
gradually during 2001 and 2002, Wagstaff and Manachotphong (2012) find that formal-sector 
employment among married men declined and informal-sector work, especially amongst 




 Medicaid offers health insurance coverage to especially marginalized US citizens including low-income adults, 
children, pregnant women, elderly people as well as people with disabilities. The program is managed on a state-




4.2 Impacts of SP 
 
Due to the manner of introduction, which conveniently allows the implementation of a quasi-
experimental research design, there exists considerable literature evaluating SP. Of special 
interest are impacts on outcomes related to health measures. Furthermore, effects on labor 
market participation are considered. These may be important within the scope of this thesis’s 
problem statement, as changes in informality could have the potential to affect family 




One of the most discussed and controversial questions regarding the introduction of UHI is 
whether recipients experience positive effects on their health. In regards to SP, there exists an 
array of papers that examines this matter. Little direct impact on the health of enrolled 
residents is detected overall. Again, it is possible that this is at least in part due to the fact that 
conducted studies examine short-term impacts only. However, for especially vulnerable 
groups, such as infants in marginalized areas, SP may have improved outcomes. 
 
A paper by Melissa Knox (2008) focusses on health-related and labor supply outcomes for 
early introducers of SP between 2002 and 2004. Corresponding findings imply an increased 
probability of making use of health services as well as a rise in the frequency of usage. Yet, 
overall health outcomes were not positively altered.  
 
Implementing a triple-difference estimation strategy, comparing workers of the informal and 
the formal sector, Barros (2008) uses data from Mexican cross-section household surveys. 
Whereas findings imply that household health expenditures significantly decreased and 
enrolled households have a higher propensity to use medical services, SP did not directly 
impact health.  
 
Focusing on the health of infants avoids issues tied to detecting lagged health impacts 
common for adults and should make the identification of direct effects of policy easier (Pfutze 
2014). Gallardo-García (2006) finds positive effects of SP on the birthweight of newborns. 
Accounting for selection on the outcome, as live births are more reliably recorded than still 
births, Pfutze (2014) examines effects of SP on infant mortality during the first five years of 
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SP. Using census data on households from 2010, associated findings imply that infant 
mortality is reduced by 5 in 1000 for the overall population and by 7 in 1000 for the 
population eligible for the program. 
 
Conti and Ginja (2017), analyzing mortality records as well as the data on hospitalizations 
also used in this paper, cover the same time frame (2000-2012) and employ a similar 
empirical strategy as I chose to. They examine whether the health of people from different age 
groups within the population is affected by SP. As they find no significant impact for young 
children, adults and the elderly, infant mortality within the poor municipalities of the country 
is reduced by 10%. This reduction implies that the lives of around 800 infants can be saved 
per year. 
 
ii. Labor Markets and Informality 
 
Another area of interest focuses on the effect of SP on labor market decisions of individuals. 
As social insurance programs are generally viewed as desirable, they pose the risk of giving 
disincentives to work in the formal sector. Concerning the introduction of SP, a number of 
papers finds negligible to no evidence of any impact on informality (see e.g. Azuara and 
Marinescu 2013, Barros 2008, Campos-Vázquez and Knox 2010). Others discover an effect, 
such as Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés (2011). They establish that there exists an 
especially high degree of mobility between formal and informal sector in Mexico. Yet, 
Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés (2011) find that SP did not directly lead to a 
substitution of formal with unformal employment. The inflow into formal employment is 
discouraged however. Short term effects seem to be most important here, as this effect is 
especially distinct in the years that directly follow SP implementation. According to their 
results, SP triggered a 20% decline in the inflow of workers into formal employment. Also, as 
SP is making people better off overall, fewer people are moving from unemployment to 
employment, leading to an overall lower labor force participation rate. The detected effects 
are robust and significant as well as biggest for large households with relatively uneducated 
household members.   
 
Knaul et al. (2012) address a common misconception regarding the definition of informality 
in past research on this issue. Non-salaried workers, including freelance workers as well as 
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those who do not participate in the actual labor force, are commonly misconstrued as 
partaking in informality and hence contributing to tax dodging. As SP provides insurance for 
everyone without affiliation to a formal employer, a much larger group is covered than those 
working informally. Possible effects on informality may then be watered down and difficult to 
identify empirically. Knaul et al. (2012) argue that a long-term analysis of the impacts of SP 
on labor market outcomes is needed in order to evaluate this issue. Also, positive effects of 
investments into health care on productivity should not be neglected in this setting.  
 
4.3 Domestic Violence 
 
Economic literature on domestic violence is overall quite limited. Considering the available 
research requires careful consideration of respective setting when the idea of extrapolating 
from results is entertained. Tankard et al. (2018, 3379) acknowledge the need for more 
research on the effects in high-income countries as well as “comparison across programs 
based on size and design”. In the following I present the most important and relevant pieces 
of research in the context of this paper. First, studies from Western high-income countries are 
addressed. Subsequently, evidence from less developed countries is summed up. 
 
i. Industrialized countries   
The first paper to be reviewed comes from Aizer (2010) and is concerned with the 
relationship between the gender wage gap and domestic violence. Earlier papers with similar 
topics failed to establish a causal relationship between women’s income and domestic 
violence because of several issues. Firstly, the endogeneity of income through either omitted 
variable bias or reverse causality remained in most cases unaccounted for. Moreover, no paper 
before incorporated the fact that it is not only the actual female wage that matters, but also the 
relative wage compared to the male partner’s as well as the potential wage that is realistically 
obtainable. Aizer (2010) uses administrative hospital data on assaulted women in California 
that do not depend on self-assessment and therefore bypass reporting related biases. Instead of 
using women’s actual wages, which are endogenously determined, Aizer utilizes the fact that 
certain fields of work predominantly occupy males or females. Constructing local wage 
proxies by measuring industry particular wage changes to create a gender specific wage ratio 
(female relative to male), Aizer finds that an increase in the wage ratio reduces the number of 
women treated at hospitals for assault. As this result could reflect the predictions of the theory 
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of exposure reduction as presented by Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld (1999), Aizer provides 
evidence that the reduction in domestic violence in fact occurs outside of working hours. She 
hence argues that her results can be seen as evidence in support of a bargaining power 
approach.  
 
A second relevant paper by Anderberg et al. (2016) is concerned with the impact of 
unemployment on domestic abuse. They incorporate a model built on the bargaining power 
approach. According to the model, unemployment should have differential impacts on each 
sex. As unemployment for men would increase the relative bargaining power of women, 
domestic violence should fall as a result. A partnership can in this context be seen as having a 
direct economic benefit. Living in a shared household can shield from the most extreme 
exposure to economic hardship, especially when both partners initially work. Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the man will be adjusting his violent behavior in order not to 
risk losing his partner. A rise in female unemployment should hence have the opposite effect. 
Anderberg et al. (2016) use disaggregated labor market data from England and Wales which 
they link up to survey data on domestic abuse in their analysis. Their results support the initial 
theory, as an increase in male unemployment with 1% leads to a reduction of violent abuse of 
the female partner with approximately 3%. Heightened female unemployment has the 
opposite effect of similar size. Gender unspecific increases in unemployment leaves violent 
abuse against the female within households unaffected. Anderberg et al. (2016) conclude with 
recommending the enhancement of women’s job security, as this would represent a 
consequential measure against domestic violence perpetrated by a male partner.  
 
Tur-Prats (2017) contributes to this area of research with evidence from Spain. Observing 
changes in female employment status, her hypothesis implies that impacts of female 
unemployment on intimate partner violence will depend on prevalent family structures. She 
refers to a stem family, where descendants remain in the familial household with their own 
spouse and children and contrasts it with the nuclear family structure, where children leave 
the household upon marriage. Assuming that women in nuclear families bear the unshared 
burden of domestic work, women in stem families share this burden with other household 
members and could hence be expected to seek employment more regularly and to be 
economically more independent. In line with this, Tur-Prats (2017) identifies heterogenous 
effects of female employment in areas where stem and nuclear families respectively were 
historically predominant. For women living in regions with prevailingly nuclear family 
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traditions, partaking in the labor market leads to increases in home violence whereas the 
opposite is true for women living in regions coined by stem family traditions.4  
 
Addressing the potential impact of unemployment on the violent victimization among young 
females, Tertilt and van den Berg (2014) employ high-quality register data from Southern 
Sweden covering the period between 1999 and 2008. This data contains narrowly defined 
diagnoses of all patients seeking medical treatment which allows to identify victims of 
violence. As there exists evidence that unemployed individuals generally are more likely to be 
victim to violence (see e.g. Bowlus and Seitz 2006, FRA 2014), the authors hypothesize that 
the unemployed youth may be at higher risk of being victimized, too. Their argument implies 
that young unemployed individuals tend to socialize more with peers who are also 
unemployed, potentially partake in criminal activities or consume illegal substances. 
Increased exposure to such a “wrong crowd” may then increase the probability of being 
victimized. The presented results imply that this indeed seems to be the case, as otherwise 
comparable women who are employed are significantly less likely to become a victim of 
violence. Yet, as the argument behind the hypothesis already hints, the violence inflicted in 
such cases is not of a domestic nature, and estimated effects are largest for violence not 
committed by a member of a shared household.  
 
On a more general level, Schneider, Harknett and McLanahan (2016) examine the impacts of 
the Great Recession in the US during the late 2000’s on violent behavior of men towards their 
female partners. Their approach differs from other research that incorporates observed 
unemployment rates, as they also consider how the pace of increasing unemployment rates 
impacts intimate partner violence. The results imply that a quickly deteriorating economy 
with rapidly rising unemployment triggers increases of abusive behavior. Controlling for 
household-specific experiences of unemployment and financial distress, this effect remains 




 Brassiolo (2016) presents additional evidence from Spain. In 2005, the costs of divorce were significantly 
reduced when a reform on marital dissolution was passed by the Spanish government. This means that divorce 
was becoming a more credible and less costly threat. Available survey data implies that the change in policy led 
to a large, significant decrease in intra-household conflict by 30%. These results are consistent with a bargaining 




ii. Less developed countries  
The first paper I want to summarize set in a non-Western country presents evidence from 
Vietnam. Bulte and Lensink (2019) examine interventions in Vietnam aimed to empower 
women and the consequential impacts on domestic violence. They use data from a 
randomized control trial and actually find that women in the treatment group are more likely 
to be exposed to domestic violence than women in the control group. Hence, the interventions 
aiming to promote gender equality seem to have perverse effects. They develop an advanced 
model, incorporating women’s bargaining power within the household, as well as the 
household’s income share contributed by women. The model implies that these two factors of 
female empowerment actually could have effects of opposed direction in regards to the 
prevalence of intimate partner violence. As bargaining power would decrease violence, 
economic independence could increase it. The authors emphasize that these results hinge on 
the women’s outside option and hence on how socially acceptable divorce is. In rural 
Vietnam, divorce is for instance socially widely unaccepted. When women cannot plausibly 
threaten divorce, encouraging women’s economic independence seems to put them especially 
at risk as their bargaining power does not effectively increase.  
 
These results are similar to the findings of Heath (2014). She uses data from Bangladesh and 
finds a positive correlation between female employment and the occurrence of home violence. 
Findings yet apply only to either uneducated women or women who are rather young upon 
marriage. It seems thus reasonable to argue that these women cannot credibly threat leaving 
and have a low degree of bargaining power to begin with. In line with Bulte and Lensink 
(2019), economic independence may then worsen the violence suffered at home as the 
husband will seek to mark is dominant position. 
 
Recent research by Bhalotra et al. (2018) addresses the same question as Anderberg et al. 
(2016), namely how shocks in employment status for men and women differentially affect 
home violence. The external circumstances differ, as data from 31 developing countries 
between 2005 and 2016 is utilized in this case. The results are intriguing as they almost 
perfectly predict effects of the same size as Anderberg et al. (2016), but of opposite direction. 
Here, increases in male unemployment by 1% raise the incidence of home violence by 2.75% 
whereas female unemployment reduces it by 2.87%. Contrary to Anderberg et al. (2016), 
these findings are in line with a male backlash approach. 
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One more paper is specifically interesting in terms of the problem statement at hand because 
of its setting. Angelucci (2008) analyzed the effect of cash transfers to Mexican women 
within the scope of the OP program on both alcohol abuse and domestic violence which are 
assumed to be strongly correlated. The average monthly cash transfer amounted to 218 pesos 
(circa 20 USD at the time), which duplicated the mean female income, since the average 
married woman earned in the sample only 17 pesos per month in the absence of treatment. In 
1998, data on residents from 506 villages in the states of Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, 
Puebla, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, and Veracruz were collected via survey. Households that 
were excluded from the sample were e.g. single-headed households or households were the 
wife was not the one responding to the survey, as the husband will not be a reliable source of 
information regarding domestic abuse. Angelucci (2008) finds that the cash transfers led to a 
15% decrease in alcohol abuse in the full sample of relevant households. The picture becomes 
blurrier in the context of domestic abuse, however. As domestic violence decreases due to OP 
by 37% in households receiving the minimum cash amount with males who completed 
primary school, there is a subgroup of women who experience harmful effects. Incidents of 
home violence actually increase for women who are entitled to large sums and are living with 
uneducated males. This applies especially when there is a considerable age gap between male 
and female. These findings are in line with a male backlash approach. As the male perceives 
the increased liquidity of the female as a threat to his identity and his dominant role within the 
household, he will exert even more violence in order to keep the woman in place. This result 
is especially interesting, as it punctuates the possibility of heterogeneous effects of well-
intended policy, as well as the possibility of detecting backlash effects in Mexico.  
 
Not addressing domestic violence directly, Elsayed and Roushdy (2017) examine how 
relaxing human capital constraints for women in Egypt affects their future labor market 
outcome as well as their intra-household decision making and view on gender roles. As 
financial prospects and skills were improved by the intervention, the latter aspects remained 
unchanged. In this context, social norms may still represent a hinder to female empowerment, 
even though women become economically more independent. The authors thus suspect that 
this may change when observing long run effects.  
 
Rather than examining impacts of economic factors or policy on home violence as the 
outcome, Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila (2010) investigate the impacts of violence on 
female labor market outcomes for different ethnic groups within the Bolivian population. 
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Bolivia exhibits very high rates of home violence compared to other developing countries, 
especially among the indigenous population. The authors hypothesize that the impact of 
violence will be relatively small for the indigenous, as domestic violence tends to be 
commonly and socially accepted within this group (Albo 1994). Female labor market 
outcomes may be unaffected, frankly speaking, because indigenous women are used to suffer 
violence. Establishing measures of physical and psychological abuse as well as a combination 
of both, findings point to a positive significant correlation between dropping out of work and 
the incidence of violence. Addressing their hypothesis tied to heterogeneous effects for 
indigenous and non-indigenous women they find that indigenous women in fact respond less 
to domestic violence than their non-indigenous counterparts. This does however not apply to 
women with high income and indigenous background.  
 
iii. Patterns 
The existing research on this topic might quantitively not be sufficient in order to conclude 
with any distinct, certain pattern emerging. However, it seems as though the bargaining power 
approach, implying reduced domestic violence as a consequence of increased female 
empowerment, applies especially well to high-income nations such as the US, UK and Spain, 
as shown in the examples above. The picture becomes blurrier in developing and threshold 
countries. As comparatively low levels of economic development correlate with more 
restrictive norms, a higher number of religious citizens, as well as traditional views on women 
and their role in society, a relative improvement in female empowerment may have perverse 
effects. When threatening leaving the relationship is a non-credible threat due to social stigma 
etc., male backlash predictions may prove true, as seen in the case study of e.g. Vietnam 
mentioned above. However, it is important to note that there appear to be heterogeneous 
effects on different groups of women in Mexico, as presented by Angelucci (2008). The 
bottom line is that there may be impacts drawing in opposite directions in any country 
examined, but it varies which one dominates overall. It hence does not seem unreasonable to 
assume that there might be perverse effects on some, even in developed countries, but that 
these are dominated and overshadowed by positive impacts on others. The possibility that 
some population subgroups become worse off thus exists. This issue specifically will not be 
addressed in this thesis any further, but represents an interesting area for future research.   
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Chapter 5: Data and descriptive statistics 
 
 
To examine the problem at hand, a total of five data sets was utilized. For the main analysis I 
employ administrative data on the respective outcomes of interest combined with the registry 
called Padrón, containing information on each household enrolled with SP. To back up the 
validity of the generated results on home violence, I employ survey data from three interview 
rounds covering the periods before, during and after the implementation of SP. Hereafter, I 
will describe each of the data sets used and discuss the key variables that are of importance 
for the further analysis. As the raw data sets needed a considerable amount of cleaning and 
manipulation, I will also sum up the most important steps that were undertaken in STATA to 
prepare the data for analysis.  
 
5.1 Data sources 
 
i. Padrón  
 
The registry of families who became enrolled with SP between 2002 until 2010, also referred 
to as Padrón, encompasses information on the households affiliated with SP in each year 
during the rollout. This data includes e.g. a unique identifier for each state and municipality of 
residence, socioeconomic features of the households as well as the exact date of affiliation 
with SP. The lastly mentioned feature will be central in creating an indicator on when each 
municipality actually had SP in active use. I will get back to this in detail.  
 
I employ a modified version of the Padrón5 which was also used by Conti and Ginja (2017) in 
their paper on health impacts of SP. Whereas the original registry data contains information 
on each affiliated family on an individual level, the data set at hand pools this information on 
a municipality level for families residing in the same area. This makes it possible to determine 
the point in time when a municipality had a specific number of households enrolled with the 
program. Unit-wise, time is measured in full years. When defining a threshold value of the 
number of families that need to be enrolled in order to consider a municipality “treated”, this 
 
5 This data was provided to me by Rita Ginja (thesis supervisor), who was granted access to this data alongside 
her co-author Gabriella Conti for their research on the effects of SP on child mortality: Who Benefits from Free 
Health Insurance: Evidence from Mexico (2017). 
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data allows to stipulate the treatment status of each municipality in each given year. As 
proposed by Conti and Ginja (2017), I define the treatment dummy taking value 1 when ten 
families have signed up with SP. This value is chosen due to two reasons mainly. Firstly, a 
total instead of a relative measure should be picked, since it is not necessarily relevant that a 
specific share of the population is covered, but the focus should be on people actively 
adopting SP. Secondly, values smaller than ten will be more prone to measurement error, 
which would introduce bias to any estimates (Conti and Ginja 2017).6  
 
Besides details on the timing of rollout, information on the wealth across municipalities 
measured at the baseline (2000) is incorporated in the data set. The parameter used in this 
context is the marginalization index, which is more broadly utilized by Mexican authorities to 
distinguish between rich and poor areas.7 Slightly over 50% of municipalities are considered 
poor according to the index. The respective variable in the data set is a dummy taking value 0 
if respective municipality is considered rich and 1 if the municipality is poor. This variable 
will be helpful in the subsequent analysis as it allows me to contemplate whether there exist 
heterogeneous effects on women in municipalities which differ in terms of average affluence. 
Additionally, the data was supplemented with information on the population counts within 
municipalities.8 Total population counts were complemented by counts for specific age 
groups that I generated in STATA. This information will be useful when controlling for prior 
to SP existing trends tied to changes in the municipality-specific population size.  
 
Ensuring a balanced panel, two things have to be considered. Firstly, the creation of new 
municipalities and accordingly the split of old ones between 2000 and 2012 has to be 
accounted for. Thus, I exclude municipalities that exhibit missing information on the poverty 
indicator measured in 2000, as those are municipalities that did not exist at that point in time. 
Hereby the sample is restricted to the municipalities existing at the baseline. Secondly, 
municipalities in the sample must have implemented SP within the year of 2010. This leaves 




 The threshold value of ten enrolled families is also adopted in other SP-related research by e.g. Bosch and 
Campos-Vazquez (2014) as well as del Valle (2014). 
7 Values on the index of marginalization from 2000 were retrieved from 
http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/CONAPO/Datos_Abiertos_del_Indice_de_Marginacion.  
8
 The population data is obtained from the CONAPO (Consejo Nacional de Población - National Population 
Council). See https://www.gob.mx/conapo.  
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ii. Hospital data 
 
The second main source of data containing information on the primary outcome of interest 
comes from administrative records from both private and public Mexican hospitals. These 
records are listing details on each patient discharged between the years 2000 and 2012.9  
 
The rich hospital data set holds information on a variety of factors on the admitted individual 
as well as the treating entity. In regard to the subsequent analysis, the information on the 
admitted patient is essential. Patient-specific variables include i.a. age, gender, the place of 
residence, the length of stay, the kind of insurance as well as so-called ICD-10 codes. The 
latter is short for International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems and 10 remarks the 10th revised version of the classification by the WHO. The 
usage of such codes in order to classify the patient’s condition as precisely as possible is 
common practice all over the world. To identify affected individuals for my analysis 
regarding domestic violence, the ICD-10 are crucial, as they narrowly define the type of 
medical condition. While domestic violence reporting suffers from a substantial dark figure 
due to underreporting, this approach ensures objectiveness. However, it has to be addressed 
that it only focusses on the subgroup of victims in need of medical attention at hospitals, 
which represents a shortcoming in terms of issues tied to selection. Using hospital data in this 
context will hence be selective with regard to the type and the severity of home violence 
inflicted (Bindler and Ketel 2019). Detected effects could hence be local in nature. Yet, it is 
probably one of the most reliable approaches available within this thematic field.  
 
ICD-10 codes consist of four figures in total, starting with one letter followed by up to 3 
digits. The system primarily follows an alphabetical order. Combining the respective letter 
with the following digits establishes groups and subgroups over all kinds of medical 
conditions. The third digit is generally optional and specifies conditions even more precisely 
in cases where this is necessary. It takes value 0 if further accuracy is redundant or impossible 
to specify. When conditions occur due to external causes, ICD-10 codes describing the actual 
trauma are complemented by an additional code specifying the nature of the source of injury. 
As the primary outcome of interest is the occurrence of violence against women perpetrated 
by an intimate partner, the relevant ICD-10 codes of interest will be those linked to Assault 
 
9




under the chapter labeled External causes of morbidity and mortality. Mentioned chapter 
covers the codes staring with the letter-digit combinations V01–Y98. Focusing on the 
subcategory of assault, this leaves me with 25 general codes in total, namely those beginning 
with X85-Y09. These can again be divided into more precisely defined subcategories. 
 
One possible way to identify those who have suffered injuries from domestic violence is to 
focus on a subset of ICD-10 codes (Y06/07/08/09) that either directly imply or specifically 
mention maltreatment, neglect and abandonment from a spouse or partner. However, as 
domestic violence suffers from underreporting and often fails to be detected, I decided to 
rather exploit the richness of the data set and identify potential victims of domestic violence 
employing some available alternative factors. I do this both in an attempt to cover those who 
were not accurately recognized as domestic violence victims as well as to increase sample 
size to improve the preciseness of estimates to be generated. Yet, I use the firstly mentioned 
approach as an alternative domestic violence specification, which I will discuss in further 
detail in chapter 7 where regression results are reviewed.  
 
The main domestic violence specification focusses on females aged 20 to 40 years. This age 
interval was chosen because it is reasonable to assume that the probability of living together 
with a partner for women that age is high.10 Additionally, I limited the pool of potential 
victims using the ICD-10 codes on assault, which leaves me with the subgroup of women 
aged 20 to 40 who fell victim to assault. One additional variable that is of major interest and 
importance for this specification in an indicator variable which tells us about the place of 
incidence when an injury is recorded.11 As established, it is most often the spouse or intimate 
 
10
 The registry data on marriages between 2000 and 2012 implies that more than 60% of marriages occur when 
the female partner is aged 20 to 40 years. Also, most women are around the age of 20 upon marriage (see figure 
A2 in the appendix). Marital status data by the United Nations Population Division (2020) shows that almost 
50% of women aged 20-24 are married in Mexico in 2000 (baseline). This share is increasing until the age of 40, 
where the share peaks around 80%. Afterwards, this rate steadily declines. The described trend continues in 
newer data on women’s marital status in Mexico measured in 2009, 2010 and 2015 respectively.  
11
 The variable indicting the place of incidence in the case of an externally caused injury takes nine distinct 
values. According to the catalog containing variable descriptions for this data, values 0 and 1 mark incidents that 
occurred at the place of residence or at residential institutions respectively. The remaining values describe events 
that happened e.g. in schools, at other public facilities or on the streets. Yet, examining how the recorded 
frequency distribution of this variable develops over the course of the observation period for assaulted women 
points to inconsistent recording. Whereas the indicator only takes value 0 (“place of residence”) in a total of 3 
cases between 2000 and 2009, it accounts for 17-24% of female assaults in the remaining three years of the 
observation period. In the first nine years, there is however an accumulation of cases that supposedly occurred in 
residential institutions (indicator taking value 1). Observations with indicator value 1 account for almost one 
third of all recorded instances of assault perpetrated against females in this period. After 2009, only 2.6% of 
observations were listed as having occurred at residential institutions, which seems like a more realistic value. 
Hence, considering the patterns in the data, I conclude that the indicator taking value 1 between 2000 and 2009 
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partner who is perpetrating the crime when a woman falls victim to violence. Limiting the 
hospital admissions to women in the age group that exhibits a high likelihood of sharing a 
household with a partner and who simultaneously fell victim to assault at the place of 
residence represents a rather convincing proxy for domestic violence victims. Of course, there 
still exists room for error using this specification. Yet, in the case of domestic violence no 
specification will be completely error-free due to issues of reporting and identification. This is 
why I argue that this specification is the best bet given the data at hand.  
 
Using the described main specification, I generate a dummy variable indicating a case of 
assumed domestic violence when taking on value 1. In order to be able to use this information 
in the further analysis, incident counts per municipality for each year are generated. With 
these counts representing the outcome of interest, the data is subsequently merged with the 
rollout data described in the previous section based on the unique municipality identifier. 
 
iii. Registry data on marriages and divorces 
 
To understand how marriage and divorce rates changed due to SP, I use registry data on both 
marriages and divorces in Mexico.12 This data is employed in the context of home violence to 
better understand how SP impacted relationship-related decision making which reflects the 
level of female empowerment and independence. In turn, this may have effects on the 
occurrence of intra-household violence. Three main areas of interest were considered with this 
data. Firstly, it is of relevance to assess how the composition of newly married couples is 
impacted by the program rollout. Secondly and thirdly, the rates of marriage and marriage 
dissolution will be considered. For reasons of comparability, the same time span as available 
for the hospital data was analyzed, namely 2000-2012.  
 
The data listing each registered marriage in Mexico contains information on couple 
characteristics in addition to the date and place where the marriage took place. Details are 
recorded separately for wife and husband and cover i.a. nationality, age, education, 
occupation and the place of residence. As I am interested in the number of marriages 
 
most likely summarizes events taking place at home, whereas the same types of incidents are disaggregated into 
two categories in the following three years. For the main specification I therefore use the cases with indicator 
value 1 for the years 2000-2009, and those taking value 0 and 1 in the years 2010-2012 to identify episodes of 
violence against women happening at home.  
12
 Both publicly available data sets were retrieved from https://www.inegi.org.mx/programas/nupcialidad/. 
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registered and whether this number is impacted by SP, the data is collapsed on a year-
municipality level in order to generate marriage counts per municipality per year. Secondly, 
the quality of the match between partners can be examined. Using the mentioned 
characteristics that are included in the data, a range of indictor variables were established to 
check whether certain assumptions about possible changes in female partner choice hold true. 
This will be discussed in further detail when addressing estimation results in chapter 7.  
 
The divorce data is structured in the same way as the marriage data, where one observation 
represents one couple that filed for divorce. In addition to information also covered in the 
marriage register, the divorce data contains auxiliary information on i.a. the number of 
children that originated from the marriage and custody arrangements, as well as the cause of 
termination and which party it was who filed for divorce. This data makes it then feasible to 
e.g. check whether there was a general increase in the number of divorces, more divorces 
initiated by wives or fewer/more terminations of marriage due to reasons tied to intra-
household violence as a consequence of SP.  
 
In the same manner as for the hospital data, dummy indicators for respective factors of 
interest were established and then collapsed to generate municipality-year counts. The same 
applies for the overall number of marriages and divorces. It is then possible to merge the data 
with the rollout data for further analysis. How this is practically done in econometric terms is 
described in detail in chapter 6. Respective results are presented in chapter 7.  
 
iv. Health Survey 
 
Besides the hospital data, one additional data set with information on the occurrence of 
domestic violence was employed. This is done in order to corroborate the main results of the 
analysis. I use data from three interview waves of the National Health and Nutrition Survey 
(Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición, ENSA/ENSANUT) which examined 45,711, 47,152 
and 50,528 households living in 321, 582 and 712 municipalities in the respective years of 
2000, 2006 and 2012.13 This means that there is available data in the period before SP (2000), 
during rollout (2006), as well as after the rollout when all states had officially implemented 
 
13 Data sets were retrieved from https://ensanut.insp.mx/.  
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SP (2012). Analyzing this data, the sample is restricted to households surveyed at least twice 
to guarantee comparability between interview waves.  
 
The surveys were conducted with detailed questionnaires on a variety of individual and 
household characteristics. In regards to health, both self-reported as well as objective health 
measures were included. For my analysis, questions implying that the interviewee suffered 
home violence, sexual violence, violence as a consequence of an argument or violence due to 
no specific motive are of interest. Besides that, information on the gender, age and marital 
status were used in order to identify a group comparable to the sample examined in the main 
analysis. In contrast to the hospital discharge data, the survey data is analyzed on an 
individual level in order to control for household specific characteristics.  
 
5.2 Descriptive trends and statistics 
 
To set the subsequent analysis into context, I present descriptive statistics and plotted trends 
in this section. In table 1 baseline characteristics prior to the introduction to SP are depicted. 
In the year 2000, the average municipality counted just short of 34,000 inhabitants with the 
smallest only having a population count of 85. The largest municipality, which is located in 
Mexico City (up until 2016 called the Federal District or Distrito Federal (DF)), counted 
substantially more than one million residents. 52.78% of the municipalities in the sample are 
considered poor according to the index of marginalization measured in 2000.  
 
Observing absolute numbers for the main outcome of interest, it can be seen that there were 
only few hospital admissions due to domestic violence in 2000. For the vast majority of 
municipalities there were no women identifiably affected by domestic violence at the 
baseline. This is also illustrated in figure 2 which plots the trend in domestic violence counts 
over the 12 years of data available. Domestic violence incidents are once again defined as 
hospital admissions of assaulted women aged 20 to 40 years who were injured in their place 
of residence, as stated in the main specification. Figure 2 illustrates that there is a large 
increase in home violence in the hospital data between 2002 and 2003, with the first states 
having introduced SP in 2002. After that, the increase slows down until there is a decrease in 
cases between 2008 and 2009. Subsequently, numbers rise again until 2011. 2012 experiences 
lower rates of home violence compared to the previous year. Taking into account the overall 
32 
 
trend in total admissions which is increasing as the years pass (see figure 4), I suspect that 
there exist additional factors causing the drastic increase between 2002 and 2003. On one 
hand side, this increase may be caused by a heightened usage of health services due to the 
introduction of SP. This is reasonable to suspect as health care finally becomes accessible for 
many who did not have coverage during previous years. Adding figure 3 to the deliberation, 
which plots the total admissions due to assault, the same drastic increase between 2002 and 
2003 becomes visible. This could speak for the existence of increased health care usage 
effects. One has yet to be careful not to put too much weight on these arguments, as illustrated 
trends are purely descriptive, depicting total numbers only.  
 
As the numbers for assault and hence for domestic violence are drastically low for the first 
three years data is available for, one could suspect reporting issues or systematic changes in 
reporting around the time SP was introduced in pilot states. This could represent a potential 
threat to the validity of the main regression results. Such suspicion becomes even stronger 
when observing the total numbers of assaults reported in the hospitals between 2000 and 
2002. In 2001, there were no registered admissions due to assault, which appears rather 
dubious. Reporting will always contain error, but if reporting and associated error is 
systematically correlated with the rollout of SP which started in 2002, estimation results will 
contain bias. That is, if underreporting is not due to permanent local conditions which are 
accounted for by municipality fixed effects (Conti and Ginja 2017). This issue will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 8, discussing potential confounders of the analysis.  
 
Examining marriage and divorce rates as complementary outcomes, it can be seen that 
marriage rates are substantially higher than divorce rates in 2000. The municipality with the 
highest per capita marriage rate that year even exhibited ca. 0.5 marriages per resident. The 
mean female age upon marriage measured on the municipality level was 25 years. The 







Table 1: Descriptive baseline statistics (2000) 
 
Share of poor Municipalities  
(2000) 
 

























































Min. Max. N 
(Mun.) 
 
      
Population  33888.7100 92765.7000 85 1338580 2431 
      
Domestic violence incidents  0.0026 0.0589 0 2 2431 
Age upon incident 28.9848 3.2247 23 40 2431 
      
Number of divorces 21.3571 92.8118 0 1712 2431 
Number of marriages 289.0782 879.3965   0 14707 2431 
      
Marriages per capita 0.0064 0.0042 0 0.4922 2431 
Divorces per capita 0.0004 0.0006  0 0.0095 2431 
      
Female age upon marriage 25.1097 1.6852 12 98 2431 
Female age upon divorce 35.1796 1.4689 12 98 2431 














































































































Chapter 6: Estimation strategy 
 
SP was launched gradually on a state-level. Starting in 2002 as a pilot project, states with 
certain characteristics were intentionally prioritized and became early introducers. Yet, the 
uncontrolled rollout of SP on a municipality level creates quasi-random variation in the data 
and leaves us with conditions suitable for implementing a quasi-natural experiment strategy. 
The panel data at hand allows to control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity across 
municipalities as well as time effects common to all municipalities. In the following, I will 
elaborate upon the most commonly used estimation methods for panel data, the choice of 
strategy for the issue at hand, the identifying assumption that this strategy rests upon, as well 
as how I implement the described procedure and tackle arising challenges in practice.  
 
6.1 Regression analysis for panel data 
 
i. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression 
 
The OLS estimator is commonly used as a central guide value in most empirical research. 
Integrating relevant factors in order to explain values of a dependent outcome variable of 
interest, the OLS estimator fits a linear function of the chosen covariates to the observations 
that minimizes the squared residuals. The respective regression equation will then be  
 
 =  + ′ +   
 
where  describes the dependent variable of interest.  denotes the constant term whereas  
is a vector over respective covariates accompanied by ′, which represents the transcribed 
vector of coefficient estimates for each covariate. The residual error term is included as . 
Associated minimization problem is then defined as  
 





with  being the sum of the squared residual. 
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In order to be able to uncover causal effects using OLS estimation, a set of assumptions has to 
be fulfilled. These are commonly referred to as the Gauss-Markov assumptions. One of the 
assumptions indicates that the estimated error term has to be uncorrelated with the included 
regressors, which is of specific relevance when using panel data.  
 
When applying the OLS estimator, panel data will be pooled (Wooldridge 2013). This means 
that data from different individuals, states, or as in this case municipalities will be treated as if 
they origin from one homogenous population. Results will then only be reliable if there is no 
remaining unobserved heterogeneity that can create omitted variable bias. In other words, one 
has to include all relevant covariates that may be correlated with outcome and error term to 
avoid skewed estimates. In most cases this is a rather unrealistic assumption to make. Panel 
data estimation methods solve this issue to a certain extend. What exactly these more 
advanced methods entail will be discussed in the next sections.  
 
 
ii. Fixed Effects (FE) Models 
 
As long as the Gauss-Markov assumptions are fulfilled, employing the OLS estimator 
presents the most efficient way of using data (Verbeek 2012). If there however is reason to 
believe that there exists unobserved heterogeneity across observation units, omitted variable 
bias will corrupt the validity of estimation results. The use of a fixed effects (FE) model can, 
at least to a certain extent, alleviate that problem. When panel data is available, using the FE 
estimator, which is also commonly referred to as the within-estimator, filters out time-
invariant individual specific (or group specific) heterogeneity from the equation. As this 
heterogeneity is assumed to be fixed over time, demeaning (subtracting the mean) debilitates 
biases which occur due to such unobserved factors. With the general model as follows  
 
! =  + "! + #′$ + ! 
 
including time-constant individual characteristics denoted as , individual unspecific time 
trends "! and $ being a set of regressors that vary both over time and across individuals, 
demeaning yields the following expression 
 
! − % = "! − "̅ + #′$ − ' + ! − ̅ 
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where effects due to  are absorbed. A factor that becomes relevant in this context is 
efficiency, as some of the variation in the data is effectively removed when using the fixed-
effect estimator. If impacts tied to individual characteristics that are constant over time are of 
interest to the researcher, this can create issues as it is not possible to ascribe time-invariant 
variables any precise, unique coefficient estimate.  
 
 
iii. Random Effect (RE) Models 
 
An alternative model which similarly to the presented FE model makes use of variation over 
time in panel data is the random effects (RE) model. The RE model builds on one main 
assumption which allows modeling unobserved individual time-invariant heterogeneity as part 
of the error term. Taking the same general regression equation structure as shown in the 
section on the FE model as a starting point, this assumption entails an uncorrelated  and $.  
 
()*, $ = 0  
 
If this assumption holds and  can be modelled as part of the stochastic error term, using the 
RE estimator will yield unbiased and consistent estimates (Wooldridge 2013). Furthermore, 
the RE estimator will use data more efficiently than the FE estimator. However, the 
underlying assumption is very strong and in practice most often unlikely to hold. This is why 
the FE model is more regularly used in today’s empirical research.  
 
 
iv. Comment on the model of choice 
 
There are several factors that influence the choice of panel data estimation strategy, some 
already swiftly touched upon in the previous sections. Considering the data at hand, it 
becomes obvious that the simplest approach, namely a pooled OLS estimation, will not yield 
reliable results. Pooling observations from all Mexican municipalities will let area-related 
heterogeneity go unaccounted for. Mexico is a very diverse country and municipalities differ 
in many respects that most likely have an impact on both the outcome of interest, domestic 
violence, as well as the timing of SP introduction. OLS estimates would hence be skewed due 
to omitted variable bias.   
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The remaining two estimation methods, FE and RE, should manage to absorb the effects of 
pre-existing heterogeneity across municipalities. Considering which of the two models to 
choose, it would be faulty to try to establish whether the actual effects are of a fixed or 
random nature (Wooldridge 2013). What really matters is to consider whether the underlying 
RE assumption of an uncorrelated  and $ holds. In the Mexican case, the independent 
variable of interest is the treatment indicator of SP introduction which can be viewed as a part 
of the vector $. Conti and Ginja (2017) examine the determinants of the timing of SP rollout 
on a municipality level in more detail. They find that half of the variation in rollout timing can 
be explained by time-constant state characteristics. Moreover, SP was introduced earlier in 
municipalities with e.g. a relatively high population count, a low marginalization index, and 
relatively many hospital and health center facilities. These differences need addressing in 
order to avoid biased estimates, but should be accounted for when using FE or RE models. 
Yet, it becomes apparent that time-invariant municipality characteristics are in fact correlated 
with the rollout of SP, which is why a FE model was chosen instead of a RE model in order to 
analyze the effects on domestic violence.  
 
6.2 Difference-in-differences estimation strategy 
 
With real world data from uncontrolled environments, there are many confounding factors 
making it difficult to identify causal effects without making further assumptions. In such 
cases, researchers employ quasi-experimental estimation strategies. With the Mexican data at 
hand, the quasi-experimental estimation strategy of choice is the difference-in-differences 
(DD) design which is a special form of FE estimation. Generally speaking, DD exploits the 
differential outcomes in treatment and control group over time, controlling for both time-
invariant individual characteristics as well as overall time trends, in order to detect the causal 
impact of policy changes (Blundell and Dias 2009). In the Mexican setting, this implies that 
changes in the occurrence of domestic violence across municipalities implementing SP at 
different points in time between 2002 and 2010 are compared. In general, observations from 
at least two such points in time are required to generate DD-estimates, hence panel data is a 
prerequisite. The deviation from the expected counterfactual outcome of the treatment group 
can in such scenario be interpreted as the causal effect of treatment. This is visualized in 
figure 5 below. The general identifying assumption is the so-called parallel trend assumption, 
that supposes same trends in municipalities in the absence of treatment. 
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The assumption allows us to write the following term 
 
,-.!|0., .! , 1 = ,-.!|0., 1 
 
which includes the expected outcome in the absence of treatment (,-.!, time-constant 
municipality characteristics with 2 indicating the respective state (0., a general time trend 
(1 and a treatment indicator .!. Treatment is hence as good as randomly assigned 
conditioned on 0. and 1. Additionally, the absence of group-specific contemporaneous 
shocks, policy changes or changes in group composition that could impact the outcome is 
crucial in order to interpret estimates as causal. 
 
 






Setting the DD approach into context with a simple example, I consider the two Mexican 
municipalities Puebla and Tijuana. These two municipalities adopted SP in different years. I 
assume Tijuana to be an early adopter of SP, having implemented it in year 1 whereas Puebla 
did not introduce it until later on. Hypothetically, data is available from just around year 1 and 
year two, after introduction. To find the causal impact of SP, municipality fixed-effects that 
are constant in time as well as time trends that are alike across municipalities have to be 




3.! = ". + 4! + 5.! + .!            671ℎ ,.!|9, 2, 1 = 0     
 
with ". being municipality fixed effects, 4! depict time fixed effects and 5 is the coefficient 
of interest displaying the impact of SP on the outcome. .! represents an idiosyncratic error 
term. In our very simple example with Tijuana and Puebla, 5 can be identified by taking first 
differences of the outcome between the two time periods for both municipalities. Constant 
municipality characteristics are thereby eliminated. 
 
,3.!|9 = :7;<0=0, 2 = >0;0 	0?7@)A=70, 1 = 2
− ,3.!|9 = :7;<0=0, 2 = >0;0 	0?7@)A=70, 1 = 1 =  4D4 +  5 
,3.!|9 = <EF?0, 2 = <EF?0, 1 = 2               
− ,3.!|9 = <EF?0, 2 = <EF?0, 1 = 1 =  4D4  
 
By calculating the difference between the respective first differences time fixed effects 
common to regions cancel out and we are left with 5 representing the estimate of SP’s causal 
effect.  
 
,3.!|9 = :7;<0=0, 2 = >0;0 	0?7@)A=70, 1 = 2 
−,3.!|9 = :7;<0=0, 2 = >0;0 	0?7@)A=70, 1 = 1 
−,3.!|9 = <EF?0, 2 = <EF?0, 1 = 2 
−,3.!|9 = <EF?0, 2 = <EF?0, 1 = 1 =  5  
 
 
6.3 Time-to-event analysis 
 
Since the data not only covers two but all Mexican municipalities as well as nine (2002-2010) 
instead of two possible implementation years, the DD estimation procedure will be slightly 
more complex. This implies that I will not only compare differences in outcome between two 
municipalities over time, but between numerous municipalities that implemented SP at 
different points in time during the rollout phase. In order to achieve a flexible model that 
suggestively indicates whether the identifying assumption of the estimation strategy holds, a 
time-to-event model is run. The simple treatment indicator in the regression equation is then 
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replaced by a term indicating any effects prior to treatment, as well as a term measuring 
effects after the implementation of the program.  
 
As one year has to be set as a base category and is consequently omitted, I follow the 
approach employed by e.g. Conti and Ginja (2017) and Bailey and Goodman (2015) and use 
1 = −1 as the control year. A resembling strategy is also used by Almond, Hoynes and 
Schanzenbach (2011). The flexible pre-treatment term will then cover years 1 ≤ −2. The 
most flexible model will hence be the following  
 
3.! =  5HIJK
D
HDL
.! +  5H!K
M
H-
.! + ". + 4! + .!      
 
where .! is a dummy variable taking value 1 if municipality m in state s had implemented 
SP in year t, and 0 otherwise. K and L respectively represent the available number of years 
before and after implementation in the data whereas k indicates the number of years between 
implementation and t. If the parallel trend assumption holds and all unobserved heterogeneity 
across municipalities is accounted for by ".,  5HIJK should not be significantly 
distinguishable from zero. 5H!K, covering the effects of SP on domestic violence in the years 
following its implementation on a municipality level, will ultimately be the coefficient of 
interest.   
 
To present results more concisely, I follow Conti and Ginja (2017) as well as Bailey and 
Goodman (2015) and estimate a compact time-to-event specification identifying short and 
long run effects of SP. This is simply done by defining appropriate dummy variables covering 
the desired time spans. Focusing on up to two years before introduction, short (0-2 years after 
launch) and long run (3+ years after launch) effects, the following equation is estimated 
 
3.! = 5 .!  N1 − :. ≤ −2 O + 5.!  N0 ≤ 1 − :. ≤ 2 O 
+5P.!  N1 − :. ≥ 3 O + ". + 4! + .!      
 
where :. indicates the year of implementation within each respective municipality. To 
ensure that there are no confounding factors that bias the coefficient estimates of interest, I 
control for an economy-wide trend in the outcome variable, supplementing the year FE. In 
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addition to this, I account for trends in the municipality-specific population size for the 
respective age brackets of interest, as differential population sizes across municipalities have 
to potential to skew estimates. This leaves us with the final regression model 
 
3.! = 5 .!  N1 − :. ≤ −2 O + 5.!  N0 ≤ 1 − :. ≤ 2 O 
+5P.!  N1 − :. ≥ 3 O + ". + 4! + 1AE=S + T)T1AE=S. + .!      
 
where 1AE=S is the global time-trend and T)T1AE=S. depicts the trend in the age-specific 
population size for each municipality. The presented model assumes that everyone eligible is 
enrolled with SP as soon as municipalities reach treated status. This is in practice not the case, 
as affiliation does not happen automatically and at once, but rather gradually over time. 
Hence, estimated coefficients reflect intention-to-treat effects (ITT) (Conti and Ginja 2018). 
Such estimates will be lower-bound. In order to obtain the average treatment effect on the 
treated (ATT), the ITT estimate would have to be divided by the share of eligible residents 
actually affiliated with SP at the point in time in question. In essence, this represents the 
application of an instrument variable estimator. Summing up, it is reasonable to expect 
potentially uncovered effects to be somewhat small in size, especially in the short run when a 
smaller share of the eligible population is covered by SP.  
 
When supplementary data sets on i.a. marriages and divorces are used, I essentially employ 
the exact same estimation strategy, only with a varying outcome of interest.  
 
6.4 Standard error estimation 
 
Adding to the mentioned challenges, issues related to the estimation of standard errors may 
emerge. Problems could for instance arise due to heteroskedasticity, which implies that the 
size of the error varies given different values of the regressor. The following OLS assumption 
implying a constant variance U of the error term E given  is then violated.  
 
*0AE| = U 
 
As heteroskedasticity rarely causes large issues, a more serious problem is related to 
potentially correlated observations when using panel data (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 
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Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Firstly, serial correlation between outcomes of the 
same observation units at different points in time can cause incorrectly estimated standard 
errors. Secondly, observations frequently come from individuals belonging to a particular 
group or entity. In the Mexican case I consider municipalities as such subordinate groups. 
When treatment is deployed on a group level, it is unlikely that the estimated error terms of 
individuals from said groups remain uncorrelated. This issue of correlation is commonly 
referred to as the Moulton problem. Moulton (1986) acknowledges that estimated standard 
errors may be severely underestimated if intra-group outcomes are correlated, which may lead 
to the faulty identification of significant coefficient estimates. This reasoning builds on 
assuming that the variance of the outcome is not only determined by an individual, but also by 
a group-specific component (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  
 
EV = *V + =V 
 
Here, i denotes the individual and g the respective group. The intra-group correlation which 





UX + UY 
 
With a fixed number of group members that is equal across all groups, the Moulton problem 
can be formally illustrated using the following expression 
 
*0A!KZ5
*0A[JYXY!JY5 = 1 + = − 1W 
 
where *0A!KZ5 represents the size of the actual, true variance and *0A[JYXY!JY5 the 
variance that is estimated with conventional methods. Standard methods fail to account for 
issues tied to within-group correlation. = describes the number of group members. The 
square-root of this expression is referred to as the Moulton factor (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
The larger this ratio, the more severe the underestimation of the actual variance using 
conventional estimation methods. This issue will be aggravated the bigger the group size = 
and the larger the group-specific variance relative to the total variance (high group correlation 
44 
 
coefficient W. In the case of = = 1 or W = 0 conventional methods yield reliable results. If 
this is not the case, there exist several methods to tackle problems tied to correlated outcomes. 
Such solutions include the estimation on a group level, a parametric approach using the 
calculated Moulton factor as well as clustering standard errors on the unit of treatment. There 
is however no quick fix resolving the issue on a general basis. Clustering standard errors on 
the level of the treated entity is a very common and the most widely used approach. However, 
its validity hinges on the availability of a sufficient amount of clusters (Angrist and Pischke 
2009). This is not an issue of concern in the case of the Mexican data since there are a total 
2431 municipalities in the sample. Hence, I cluster standard errors at this level and account 
for issues arising due to both heteroskedasticity and correlated observations.  
Chapter 7: Results  
 
In this chapter the main findings and regression estimates from the data analysis will be 
presented. Different outcomes of interest were examined, the main one being the absolute 
count of domestic violence incidences in each respective municipality in every year of the 
observation period between 2000 and 2012.  
 
Firstly, the main regression estimates on home violence will be presented. In order to be able 
to appropriately interpret these results I will subsequently elaborate upon changes in the 
observed household dynamics using registry data on marriages and divorces. With an 
improved female outside option as a consequence of SP, one might expect changes when 
examining female relationship-related decision-making. Testing several hypotheses implying 
increases in female empowerment due to SP, I find some evidence that this is the case even 
though many estimates remain insignificant. Thus, the complementary analysis implies that 
women seem to have become more independent from their male counterparts.   
 
7.1 Domestic violence  
 
i. Main results  
 
This subchapter covers the main results of this paper addressing the impacts of SP on 
domestic violence. Using the main specification, I examine females aged 20 to 40 years who 
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have been victim to an assault in their place of residence. To reassure that the identifying 
assumption of the DD strategy holds, which is the common trend assumption across 
municipalities in the absence treatment, a time-to-event model was run. The full version 
included data on up to 7 years prior to as well as after SP and is graphically depicted in figure 
6. After controlling for municipality and year FE as well as described trends pre-SP, there are 
no significant impacts on domestic violence levels before entering SP. The plotted regression 
line lies flat in the years prior to implementation, with a 95% confidence interval including 
zero at all times. Figure 6 thus supports the validity of the common trend assumption. 
Therefore, the time-to-event model substantiates the reliability of the estimation approach, 
even though with some noise. With the year before SP introduction (1 = −1) set as a baseline, 





































Table 2: Effects of SP on domestic violence (simple DD) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DV ln (DV) DV ln (DV) 
 









 (0.0134) (0.00505) (0.0149) (0.00503) 
     
Year & Mun. FE X X X X 
     
Trend Controls - - X X 












Note: This table displays least square estimates of the impact of SP on home violence. The dependent variable in column (1) 
and (3) is the total count of domestic violence incidents per municipality per year (2000-2012). Respective regressand for 
columns (2) and (4) is the identical count measured in logs. Presented estimates follow a DD estimation strategy with all 
specifications including year and municipality FE. Column (3) and (4) additionally include controls for both an economy-
wide trend in the outcome and trends in the municipality-specific population size for residents aged 20-40 years. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Simple DD estimates of the impact of SP on domestic violence levels depicted in regression 
table 2 indicate small, but significant increases. Results are presented both measured in levels 
and in the natural logarithmic form. As the existence of a common trend in levels rules out 
parallel trends in logarithmic form, I will focus on the absolute number of home violence 
incidents as the regressor of interest for the further analysis (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The 
depicted results in table 2 are in line with a male backlash model that predicts increasing 
violence levels. According to the model, male aggressive behavior is triggered in an attempt 
to uphold the male’s dominant position within the household as the female faces a more 
attractive outside option. 
 
The results listed in table 3 depict a compact version of the time-to-event specification, 
making it feasible to examine the impacts of SP in the shorter and longer run. These results 
present the principal results of this paper. Three time periods measured relative to the year 
prior to SP implementation are examined separately. Firstly, the time span pre-SP, covering 
two and more years before rollout, should ideally not generate any significant impacts. 
Secondly, one interval capturing the short-term impacts is included (0-2 years after SP) as 
well as an interval accounting for the impacts in the longer run (3+ years after introduction). 
Supporting the general implications of the simple DD results, estimates imply increases in 
violence due to SP using this model specification, too. Long run effects tend to be larger than 
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short run effects which is intuitive considering that estimates represent ITT effects. As the 
number of SP affiliates becomes larger over time, treatment intensity increases gradually. 
This may partially explain the size gap between short and long run effects. When estimates 
were to be adjusted for the take-up rate among residents, establishing ATT effects, this gap 
might hence diminish to some extent. 
 
Uncovered effects on domestic violence are driven by rich municipalities.14 Especially in the 
short run, effects are solely due to changes in violence in relatively affluent areas. Poor 
municipalities in Mexico are typically much smaller and more rural than their rich 
counterparts. 
 
Table 3: Effects of SP on domestic violence (compact time-to-event specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) 





Rich Municipalities  
 







(inclusive) SP (β1) (0.0134) (0.00691) (0.0283) 
 







SP (β2) (0.0136) (0.00876) (0.0270) 
    
3 or more years after  0.0967*** 0.0362* 0.146* 
SP (β3) (0.0258) (0.0154) (0.0586) 
    
Year & Mun. FE X X X 
    
Trend Controls X X X 
    
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.0005 0.0628 0.0128 










Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on home violence employing a 
compact time-to-event specification. Effects are estimated for all municipalities in column (1) as well as separately for the 
poor and rich municipalities in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The outcome is the total count of domestic violence 
incidents per municipality per year (2000-2012). The presented estimates result from a DD estimation strategy with all 
specifications including year and municipality FE, controls for both an economy-wide trend and trends in the municipality-
specific population size for residents aged 20-40 years to ensure that the common trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
14
 This observation presents an interesting topic for further research. Assuming for instance that informality 
matters in the context of home violence as briefly discussed in chapter 3, it could be examined whether a 
noticeably high number of men became self-employed in Mexico’s rich municipalities. This would imply that 
they exited the formal labor market, possibly resulting in more time spent at home.  
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The average population measured at the baseline (2000) in rich Mexican municipalities is 
almost five times larger than the mean population in poor municipalities. It appears 
reasonable to assume rurality to be somewhat correlated with stricter traditions and norms as 
well as less progressive views related to gender roles than in more urban areas. Violence, too, 
tends to be especially prevalent in rural areas (World Health Organization 2005). As 
Canavire-Bacarreza and Rios-Avila (2010) show for the case of indigenous women in Bolivia, 
a high prevalence of home violence can lead to its occurrence being socially accepted. 
Women may then accept violence as a given and incorporate its incidence in their views on 
gender roles. They may then become less responsive to empowering policies.  
 
Beath et al. (2013) argues that measures to empower women usually fail to have desired effect 
on a social level in highly conservative areas, as no impacts of economically empowering 
policy can be found on female intra-household decision-making or views on gender roles. 
These implications from a study set in rural Afghanistan are in line with the findings of 
Elsayed and Roushdy (2017) discussed in the literature review (chapter 4). Hence, it can be 
suspected that this reasoning might apply to rural Mexican municipalities as women do not 
seem to change their behavior when they relatively gain economic independence as a result of 
SP. I elaborate upon the latter fact in more detail presenting the complementary results in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
The more empowered women become, the more violence will be exerted upon them if the 
male backlash approach holds true, which results indicate so far. The fact that poor 
municipalities experience an increase in violence in the long run resonates with the argument 
made by Elsayed and Roushdy (2017) about the stickiness of gender views from a female 
perspective. It may take longer to break up stereotypes connected to the prevalent machismo 
culture in poor and more rural areas than in the rich ones, which may eventually lead to more 
independent, empowered female behavior. It is also imaginable that the indirect impact of 
female economic independence on social empowerment established by e.g. Majlesi (2016) 
needs to be more substantial in order to create a significant effect on female decision-making 
in a setting such as the one in poor municipalities. Elsayed and Roushdy (2017) as well 
acknowledge this by addressing that the view on the female gender role is hardly altered by 




Another factor to consider is the role of informal employment in poor municipalities. When 
examining poor municipalities, an initial high degree of informality has to be considered 
(Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier, and Pagés 2011). Data presented by Dougherty and Escobar 
(2013) show that states with especially high rates of informality as of 2005 are typically those 
consisting mainly (≥50%) of poor municipalities according to the marginalization index 
measured in 2000. For poor municipalities, given initial high levels of informality, this 
reinforces findings of previous research which imply mostly negligible impacts of SP on labor 
market decisions. On the other hand, this points to households being less frequently covered 
by health insurance through formal employment prior to SP. Hence, the incentive to stay with 
a violent husband due to the fact that he provided health care for the whole family would not 
have been existent for many. SP presented an improvement for the household as a whole, but 
did not distort the power structure or the relative merit of the female outside option.  
 
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the specified domestic violence indicator and hence the 
validity of presented findings, I ran the same estimation using the alternative, more narrowly 
defined domestic violence specification described in chapter 5. Naturally, the total count of 
violence incidents drops when this specification is used. According to this specification in 
2000, the municipality mean of home violence incidents is 0.0096. This value is lower than 
the corresponding value presented in table 1. Respective regression tables (A1 and A2) can be 
found in the appendix. The results are overall encouraging and indicate increases of violence 
due to SP as well. The largest effects are once more detected in the rich municipalities of the 
sample. Yet, the results of the alternative specification are less reliable due to the fact that 
there is always one out of three pre-SP coefficients getting a significant coefficient estimate 
assigned, both when controlling for trends and when desisting from this control. Apart from 
this issue, the results can act as a reference point in terms of the direction of the true effect.  
 
7.2 Household composition  
 
i. Marriages and divorces 
 
The motivation behind examining marriage and divorce rates in the context of home violence 
is to verify that the introduction of SP actually led to female empowerment. With SP in place 
women do not have to rely on either being married to a husband working in the formal sector 
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or being formally employed themselves in order to gain access to health insurance. Marriage 
could hence be discouraged by the introduction of SP. This is especially important in the case 
of Mexico where women, particularly those with low education, tend to be secondary earners 
at most (Juarez 2008). In practice, this often translates into informal work or unemployment. 
The same argument applies to possible changes in divorce rates due to SP. With an increasing 
degree of female independence divorce rates may be expected to increase overall.  
 
In table 4, regression results for the short and long run impacts of SP on the numbers of 
divorces are presented. The dependent variable is measured in absolute values instead of 
logarithms as there were small municipalities in the sample with zero divorces in some years 
during the observation period (2000-2012). I present a compact time-to-event specification, 
controlling for an economy-wide trend as well as trends in the municipality-specific 
population size. The age-specific subgroup of interest in connection to the population size is 
defined as including all residents aged 15-64 years because it is in this age interval the lion’s 
share of both marriages and divorces occur (see figures A1 and A2). Controlling for trends 
ensures that β1 is not distinguishable from zero, which in turn indicates that there were no 
impacts of SP prior to introduction. This adds credibility to the parallel trend assumption 
being the identification assumption behind the employed estimation strategy.  
 
Whereas column (1) shows the impact on divorces overall, the possibility of heterogeneous 
effects across rich and poor municipalities is accounted for by presenting estimates for both of 
these groups separately. The overall estimates imply an increased number of divorces in the 
long run due to the introduction of SP. Per municipality on average, there are around five 
additional divorces as a consequence of SP three to maximal seven years after rollout. Plotting 
the density of the female age distribution upon divorces (figures A1 in the appendix) relative 
to the timing of introduction of SP illustrates this as the distribution becomes wider spread. 
These effects in respect to divorces are driven exclusively by the rich municipalities in the 
sample which corresponds to the principal findings on home violence. In the long run, an 
average increase of around ten divorces per rich municipality is estimated for the given time 
frame. As the rich municipalities denote significant increases, also in the short run, there is no 
increase identifiable for the subsample of poor municipalities. In fact, there even seems to 





Table 4: Effects of SP on divorce rates (compact time-to-event specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) 














(inclusive) SP (β1) 
 
(0.762) (0.0986) (1.482) 
0 to 2 years after  1.397 -0.0422 2.980* 
SP (β2) (0.726) (0.0756) (1.362) 
    
3 or more years after 4.648** -0.324* 9.997*** 
SP (β3) (1.584) (0.143) (2.919) 
    
Year & Mun. FE X X X 
    
Trend Controls X X X 
    
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.0052 0.0179 0.0008 










Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on divorces employing a compact 
time-to-event specification. Effects are estimated for all municipalities in column (1) as well as separately for the poor and 
rich municipalities in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The outcome is the total count of registered divorces per municipality 
per year (2000-2012). The presented estimates result from a DD estimation strategy with all specifications including year and 
municipality FE, controls for both an economy-wide trend and trends in the municipality-specific population size for 
residents aged 15-64 years to ensure that the common trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered 





A corresponding pattern in terms of effect size can be observed when examining marriage 
rates. Respective regression results are illustrated in table 5. Coefficient estimates remain 
insignificant when studying effects for poor and rich municipalities separately. However, the 
marriage rate decreases significantly both in the short and in the long run when observations 
from rich and poor areas are pooled. Again, the mere magnitude of the effect is driven by rich 
municipalities. These results add credibility to the hypothesis that SP had empowering effects 
on females which led to more independent decision-making behavior. Also, in terms of effect 
size and heterogeneity analysis, estimated effects support the main assumptions on 




Table 5: Effects of SP on marriage rates (compact time-to-event specification) 
 
Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on marriages employing a compact 
time-to-event specification. Effects are estimated for all municipalities in column (1) as well as separately for the poor and 
rich municipalities in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The outcome is the total count of registered marriages per 
municipality per year (2000-2012). The presented estimates result from a DD estimation strategy with all specifications 
including year and municipality FE, controls for both an economy-wide trend and trends in the municipality-specific 
population size for residents aged 15-64 years to ensure that the common trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the municipality level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
ii. Couple characteristics 
 
Not only quantitative measures of marriages and dissolutions thereof can be impacted by SP. 
Qualitatively, the composition of couples may change when female incentives are altered. 
Using the register data on marriages once more, I consider potential impacts of the 
introduction of SP on four different measures. Firstly, I examined whether the share of 
women marrying older men changes. Marrying older men has historically been the norm and 
reflected traditional gender roles and the corresponding distribution of power within the 
household (Wheeler and Gunter 1987). For young women this may point to the existence of 
incentives to marry a provider rather than a romantic partner. Decreases in the number of 
couples which exhibit this characteristic would thus imply qualitatively more equal couples, 
possibly also in other respects than age. Compact time-to-event estimates including trend 
controls presented in column (1) of table 6 show no significant impact on this measure 
 (1) (2) (3) 














(inclusive) SP (β1) (2.703) (0.990) (5.795) 
    
0 to 2 years after   -7.560* -0.336 -7.133 
SP (β2) (3.735) (0.776) (6.760) 
    
3 or more years after -13.24* -0.440 -14.72 
SP (β3) (6.235) (1.574) (11.25) 
    
Year & Mun FE X X X 
    
Prior Trend Control X X X 
    
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.1035 0.9097 0.4015 











however.15 Secondly, the impact on the share of unemployed women who marry a formally 
employed man are evaluated. As there is a direct monetary incentive for unemployed and 
hence uninsured women to get married to a man who can act as a provider of health insurance 
prior to SP, it is reasonable to suspect that this share declines with SP in place. The respective 
findings in column (2) show that there indeed is an immediate, significant decline in this 
parameter. Next in column (3), to address the idea of men acting as a provider, I analyze the 
age gap (measured in years) between partners conditioned on the female partner being 
younger than the male.  
 
Table 6: Effects of SP on household composition (compact time-to-event specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 “Marrying up” 
 in age 
Unemployed 
Female 
Age Gap Education  
Gap 
 









(inclusive) SP (β1) (0.00305) (0.00305) (0.0376) (0.00288) 
     
0 to 2 years after  0.000263 -0.00897** 0.0495 0.00116 
SP (β2) (0.00281) (0.00319) (0.0350) (0.00265) 
     
3 or more years after -0.000528 -0.00481 0.0716 0.00203 
SP (β3) (0.00418) (0.00453) (0.0618) (0.00397) 
     
Year & Mun. FE X X X X 
     
Trend Controls X X X X 
     
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.9551 0.0031 0.3662 0.3662 












Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on the composition of newly married 
couples employing a compact time-to-event specification. Four outcomes of interest are considered: (1) the percentage of 
women marrying older men, (2) the percentage of unemployed women marrying employed men, (3) the age gap between 
partners measured in full years, given the female is younger than the male and (4) the education gap, defined as a dummy 
indicator taking value 1 when the man is the more educated one in the relationship, between male and female. Presented 
estimates follow a DD estimation strategy with all specifications including year and municipality FE as well as controls for 
both an economy-wide trend in the outcome and trends in the municipality-specific population size for residents aged 15-64 
years to ensure that the common trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the municipality 





 Because coefficient estimates are easy to interpret and since I am primarily interested in marginal effects, not 
predictions, I employ a linear probability model instead of a nonlinear model for binary outcome variables such 
as a logistic or probit regression. 
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Complementing results from column (1), the size of the age gap remains unimpacted by SP 
when considering all municipalities in the sample. Lastly, it is assessed whether SP had any 
significant impact on the education gap between husband and wife. I model this factor as a 
dummy variable taking value 1 if the male is better educated than the female and 0 otherwise. 
In this case, too, I fail to uncover any significant impacts.  
 
As for the outcomes on marriage and divorce rates, the possibility of differential impacts in 
poor and rich municipalities is incorporated in the analysis. Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix 
present corresponding findings estimated separately for the rich and the poor. Just like in the 
preceding part of the analysis, any significant effects are driven by rich municipalities. Whilst 
there are no impacts on the quality of the match within poor municipalities, the effects 
estimated for rich municipalities are more distinct than in the overall estimation. Rich 
municipalities denote a decline in the share of unemployed women marrying a working man 
due to SP by over 1 percent point. This significant effect represents a direct impact, 
observable during the short run after SP was implemented. In addition, one rather surprising 
result can be found in column (3) of table A4. It shows that the age gap significantly increased 
both in the short and the long run in rich municipalities. This result is rather counterintuitive 
and does not fit underlying hypotheses of increasingly empowered female behavior as a 
consequence of SP. However, the estimated effect is small in magnitude, considering that 
values are measured in full years. Also, the share of women who marry up in age is not 
impacted (see coefficient estimated in column (1) of table A4). I am hence inclined to not 
focus on this finding in more detail.  
 
iii. Divorce initiation and violence as a reason for divorce 
 
Not only the initial composition of the couple upon marriage could be impacted by SP. The 
reason behind filing for divorce may change and the person initiating the divorce may more 
frequently be the wife when women become relatively more empowered. Using the registry of 
divorces between 2000 and 2012, I examine whether the share of divorces set in motion by 
the female partner increases when SP is launched. This hypothesis reflects the improved 
outside option women face due to SP. Also, since the tolerable amount of violence decreases 
in a bargaining power framework when women become more empowered (as shown in figure 
1), one could expect to find that more divorces were filed due to reasons of home violence. As 
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same sex marriage became effectively legal in some parts of the country during the time 
period examined, only heterosexual couples were included in the sample.  
 
Running the same kind of regression on the two described outcomes as in the previous 
sections fails to uncover any significant effects. This is of course disappointing in a sense that 
the contemplated hypotheses remain unconfirmed. However, such insignificant findings were 
not improbable to begin with. In respect to divorce initiation, a substantial amount of error in 
the data should be expected since it is not necessarily the spouse who wanted the split that 
filed for divorce. Also, as divorce is connected to social stigma, there might exist a substantial 
lag to any SP related impact that the time frame observed may not cover to its full extend. In 
regards to divorces where intra-household violence was stated as the official reason for the 
separation, it is highly likely that there exists a substantial dark figure tied to underreporting. 
The female might not want to risk potential repercussions from a violent ex-husband when 
stating violence as a decisive factor on the divorce papers. Hence, not discovering any 
attention-grabbing results does not come as a surprise in this case. 
 
7.3 Self-reported domestic violence 
 
One palpable concern assessing the validity of the findings on domestic violence is whether 
the discovered effects are solely due to an increased usage of health care connected to SP. It is 
self-explanatory that people will use health services more extensively when they become 
more accessible as well as free of charge. One alternative to pinpoint if this confounds the 
estimation is to examine a suitable control group whose condition is impossibly impacted by 
SP. Increases in hospital admissions for such a control group would point to effects due to a 
more frequent health care usage and render previous estimates on domestic violence 
unreliable. If no impacts are found however, this would strengthen the validity of the primary 
results of this paper. Yet, considering all the potential ways in which SP could impact 
people’s incentives, this approach is not as straightforward as it may appear at first glance. 
Taking victims of vehicle accidents as an example, it may seem reasonable to assume these 
kinds of incidences to be random in nature, all else equal, and uncorrelated with SP. Yet, 
drivers may become more complacent and behave generally more recklessly when they have 
insurance in place. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as moral hazard and Einav and 
Finkelstein (2018) present a more comprehensive account of its role in connection with health 
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insurance. Hence, assuming that trends concerning the number of vehicle accident victims 
admitted to hospitals are not being impacted by SP could easily turn out erroneous. The 
control group-based approach using the available hospital data can therefore not be deemed 
reliable.  
 
Instead of focusing on a control group, alternative data from a health survey was employed. 
Using the available information from the extensive survey data which covers three interview 
rounds from the years 2000, 2006 and 2012, a pooled OLS regression was used to check 
whether there was an impact of SP on reported incidents of domestic violence within the first 
year of implementation.16 More precisely, the outcome of interest is defined as a dummy 
variable indicating that an interviewee has reported experiences of home violence during the 
last twelve months. The regressors of interests are firstly an indicator taking value 1 if SP was 
introduced one year prior to the interview and zero otherwise, as well as an interaction 
variable, specifying the differential impact of equivalent treatment specifically within rich 
municipalities. The differential impact for the rich is of interest as the main analysis indicates 
effects to be driven by exactly these areas. This approach is chosen instead of estimating the 
model separately for the poor and rich to ensure sufficient sample size. I also included a range 
of control variables such as i.a. indicators on age and education levels of household members 
as well as municipality-specific population and labor force related measures. Respective 
regression results are illustrated in table 7. To guarantee comparability in respect to the main 
home violence results, I defined the group of domestic violence victims as married women 
aged 20 to 40 whose answers in the questionnaire implied the incidence of home violence. 
 
Whereas there is no significant impact of SP on home violence for the poor municipalities, 
there exists a significant differential effect for women residing in rich municipalities. The 
estimate is in line with previous findings using the hospital data which is promising as it adds 
to the validity of the primary results of this paper. Uncovered effect in the survey data is yet 
small. I argue that this is firstly because estimated effects in the main analysis are small and 
secondly because survey data often suffers from selective reporting. Underreporting may also 
be the reason for not detecting any significant impacts of SP for the poor. Also, it has to be 
acknowledged that the significant coefficient estimate for the rich municipalities represents a 
differential, not a total effect. Overall, these results are still useful and encouraging as they 
 
16
 I assume the heterogeneity of households in the sample to be accounted for by included control variables. In 
this case, the simple OLS estimator is best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) and uses data efficiently.   
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point to relative increases of violence after SP implementation within rich municipalities. This 
hints that previously estimated effects on home violence are valid, at least in terms of the 
direction of uncovered effects.  
 




Impact of SP in poor municipalities (5) -0.003 
(launch one year prior to interview) (0.004) 
  
Differential impact of SP in rich municipalities (5K[\) 0.006* 
(launch one year prior to interview) (0.003) 
  
  
Mean Violence Poor (2000) 0.00901 
 (0.110) 
Mean Violence Rich (2000) 0.0122 
 (0.0945) 






Note: This table displays ordinary least square estimates of the impact of SP on self-reported home violence. Depicted effects 
represent impacts for poor municipalities (5) as well as the differential impact within rich municipalities (5K[\). The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating an episode of home violence during the past 12 months when taking value 
1. Control variables include measures on poverty, population size, labor market indicators, the supply of health care as well 
as the education level and age of relevant individuals within households. Mean values refer to the indicator for the occurrence 
of violence (either value 0 or 1) measured at the baseline (2000). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
municipality level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
                        
Chapter 8: Sensitivity analysis 
 
8.1 Validity of the Empirical Strategy  
 
i. Common Trend Assumption 
 
The significance and value of the results presented hinge on the validity of the empirical 
strategy used. To evaluate this as carefully as possible, several issues have to be considered. 
Firstly, the parallel trend assumption, as one identifying assumption of the DD approach, has 
 
17
 Similar results are found when focusing on women aged 25-40. Associated effects seem therefore not to be 
driven solely by very young individuals.  
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to hold in order to be certain that estimates depict more than mere correlations. This implies 
that there should not exist any time-variant unobserved factors that are correlated with both 
the timing of SP rollout and the outcome, creating deviating trends. Such differing trends 
would put the validity of any estimation results in jeopardy. It is however not possible to test 
this assumption directly, as counterfactual outcomes always remain unobservable to the 
researcher. Something that can be done in order to add credibility to the assumption is to 
provide suggestive evidence of its validity by showing parallel trends between groups prior to 
treatment. As for the main outcome of home violence, I presented a visual indication of this in 
figure 6. Also, the compact time-to-event specification used to generate the main results 
implies no overall impacts of treatment for the period prior to the actual introduction of SP 
when using the described set of controls. Municipalities may thus experience different levels 
of violence accounted for by the municipality-specific FE, but follow overall similar trends 
over time. This supports the common trend assumption for the main results of this paper. 
Additionally, the robustness of this conclusion was assessed by re-scaling the outcome 
variable prior to SP implementation, subtracting any fixed effects, and running a regression on 
the treatment indicator. No correlation was found, which, again, is reassuring.  
 
For the complementary results on marriage and divorce rates I show an alternative graphical 
illustration of common municipality trends in the outcome prior to SP. In figure 7 and 8, I 
respectively plot the average number of divorces and marriages per municipality for all 
municipalities implementing SP in the same year over time. Generally speaking, there are 
only slight overall trends observable, both for divorces and marriages, with plotlines lying 
relatively flat. In the case of divorces, a slight upward trend, if anything, in the average count 
is detectible for most municipalities. As municipalities introducing SP relatively late (2008-
2010) are few in number and tend to be small, it is not surprising that there is no clear trend 
observable. In regards to the rates of marriage, there is also a quite constant, potentially 
slightly decreasing trend.  
 
As the overall trend seems to be similar across municipalities that introduced the program at 
different points in time, there is one rather distinct outlier when observing the average number 
of divorces. The very first municipalities to implement SP during its pilot phase in 2002 seem 
to experience a steeper incline than later introducers. One factor that may matter in this case, 
is that only two years of data are available for these observation units prior to treatment. 
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Hence, it is generally hard to extrapolate from this trend, both in terms of refuting or 
confirming the common trend assumption. 
 









Yet, as the SP rollout on state level was consciously and deliberately decided upon using a set 
of criteria such as the available hospital infrastructure, potential SP-demand, the financial 
ability to execute the program efficiently etc., the first municipalities to introduce SP may be 
systematically different from the remaining municipalities. These areas may thus follow a 
differential trend in the outcome of interest. One approach to assess if this is the case may be 
to drop early introducers from the sample and see how estimates change. Yet, this would lead 
to excluding many rich municipalities which were typically among the early introducing 
municipalities. As shown, the rich municipalities were presumably the drivers behind 
uncovered effects. Considering this fact, it seems reasonable to incorporate the heterogeneity 
across municipalities into the assessment of the common trend assumption. I focus on the 
results for the rich municipalities in more detail, as it is here, I find the most distinct and 
significant effects. In figure 9 the flexible time-to-event specification covering all available 
years of data is plotted specifically for rich municipalities with the impact on the divorce 
count measured on the Y-axis.  
 
 




























The plot shows largely no impacts in the time before rollout. The 95% confidence interval 
contains the value zero in all prior years, except when 1 = −2. Impacts here are however very 
small and the confidence interval is close to including zero. There are significant, and in the 
long run also quite large impact of SP on the rates of divorce within rich municipalities, as 
already discussed presenting regression results. Summing up, the visual evidence as well as 
the respective time-to-event coefficients fail to refute the parallel trend assumption in respect 
to the complementary outcomes when the heterogeneity across states is accounted for. This 
adds credibility to the presented estimation results.  
 
ii. Possible confounders 
 
 
Any data-based analysis that aims to establish causal effects between some factors of interest 
will meet challenges. Even randomized control trials, often coined the gold standard approach 
to empirical questions, can suffer from a variety of biases. Using quasi-experimental 
estimation designs, where identifying assumptions have to be credibly substantiated, such 
sources are multiple. When a DD estimation strategy is employed, the parallel trend 
assumption is not the only crucial underlying assumption that has to hold in order to generate 
credible results. In the following sections, some so far unmentioned possible confounders 
which present potential threats to the validity of the main analysis will be touched upon. Some 
of the listed factors of concern appear more serious than others. In any case, it reminds the 
reader that any empirical findings have to be considered with a grain of salt.   
 
a. Quality of reporting  
 
The DD estimation strategy builds on the ceteris paribus assumption when treatment occurs, 
as well as during the observed time following. Estimates can only be interpreted as depicting 
causal impacts when no other kind of policy or shock happens simultaneously, impacting the 
outcome. In the case of the Mexican data, this implies that the reporting of the outcome has to 
be consistent and should hence be of the same quality during the whole observation period.  
 
Considering the sources of data for this paper, it is the hospital data that will likely be prone to 
error. Making mistakes lies in human nature and it is reasonable to assume that ICD-10 codes 
will in some cases be either misspecified or missing. If error occurs more or less randomly, 
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misreporting poses no major problem to the analysis per se. If, however, the standards and the 
quality of reporting admissions due to assault over time is systematically correlated with the 
timing of SP rollout, the validity of generated estimates may be violated (Conti and Ginja 
2017). This is, if fluctuations in reporting quality cannot be accounted for by incorporated 
fixed effects or trend-related control variables.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 in chapter 5 visualize that the number of recorded incidents related to assault 
and domestic violence appear so have changed dramatically between 2002 and 2003. In the 
case where this is due to changes in reporting practice or standards, estimating causal effects 
of SP may be problematic. The reason behind this is that the first states introduced SP in 2002 
and changes in reporting may coincide with treatment for early introducers. Since there exists 
the same observable increase in both assault and home violence cases, I argue that a possible 
reporting change is tied to the IDC-10 codes relating to assault and not the other variables 
used to establish the domestic violence indicator. Considering figure 4, which is depicting the 
trend in total admission, there appears to be an increasing time trend. This alone seems 
however not to account for the drastic jump in figure 2 and 3. Again, the examined issue tied 
to potential increases in the usage of health services overall might play a part in this. Yet, this 
issue will not be further considered here, as the complimentary analysis using the survey data 
debilitated this argument to the doable extent. Also, there is only one such explicit leap even 
though one might suspect several if increased usage is the issue, as the rollout was gradual.18  
 
If the reporting of assault cases changed systematically in or around 2003, estimated treatment 
effects for early introducers might contain bias. To suggestively check whether the sharp 
increase in the number of assault and domestic violence cases in 2003 is accounted for by 
fixed effects and trend controls, I drop early introducers (2002 and 2003) from the sample and 
check whether there are any significant impacts of treatment measurable prior to the actual 
introduction of SP for the remaining municipalities. This approach of course depends on the 
drastic increase in incidents occurring not only in the municipalities introducing SP in 2002 
 
18
 Such imaginable increases after 2003 could of course be less apparent. Since states introducing SP early were 
typically more populous, a relatively high total number of residents became eligible to SP when it was 
introduced as a pilot in 2002. Therefore, the increase in the total number of assault and domestic violence cases 
between 2002 and 2003 may turn out especially distinct. However, figures 2 and 3 do not even indicate minor 
corresponding leaps during the remaining time of rollout which could not plausibly be accounted for by the 
overall increasing time trend in total admissions. 
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and 2003, but also in the remaining sample, which is the case.19 The estimated impact size can 
be expected to change as a large share of the rich municipalities driving the initial effects are 
excluded. For the trimmed sample, excluding pilot states, there are no significant impacts 
prior to SP detectable. I examine this separately for rich and poor municipalities. Hence, I 
conclude that factors leading to the jump in assault-related admissions between 2002 and 
2003 (such as e.g. changes in reporting practice) are accounted for by controls incorporated in 
the model used and pose no major threat to the validity of presented estimation results.  
 
b. Abortion reform  
 
Factors that often cause major issues when implementing a DD estimation strategy are critical 
events that happen at the same time as the policy to be evaluated taking effect. The ceteris 
paribus assumption is in such case not credible. This poses a repeating problem in empirical 
research. Especially regarding the data set at hand, where a long time span covering many 
years is observed, there are a multiple other factors besides SP that may have impacted home 
violence systematically. One prominent policy change coming into effect in 2007 in Mexico 
City may represent such a confounding factor to the analysis. Coinciding with SP rollout for 
some municipalities, a major reform was passed in Mexico City (still referred to as the 
Federal District of Mexico at that time) legalizing abortions. This pro-choice policy was 
groundbreaking, as abortion generally used to be illegal and in the whole country prior to 
2007. Whereas there were only 62 legally executed abortions during the six years prior to the 
reform in Mexico City, there were over 90,000 between 2007 and 2012 (Clarke and Mühlrad 
2018). Women residing in other states may also legally interrupt their unwanted pregnancies 
in Mexico City against a fee based on their socioeconomic background. Travelling may 
however present an obstacle for many of those residing far away from the capital.  
 
As many self-induced and secret abortions have to be anticipated prior to 2007, the then 
introduced policy gives women the legal right to decide over their own body and future for 
the first time. This reform thus clearly represents an improvement in regards to female 
empowerment and may trigger similar intra-household responses as SP. Women become more 
empowered because they no longer have to risk their own health by inducing abortions 
 
19
 This fact, too, invalidates the assumption of increased health service usage being the main reason behind the 
increase in assault-related admissions between 2002 and 2003.  
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illegally without medical assistance. Also, they do no longer risk substantial penalties when 
deciding to terminate a pregnancy. This in turn implies an improved outside option when in 
doubt about whether to commit to a possibly violent man and carry his baby. Yet, not all 
regions of Mexico are as progressive as Mexico City and as a response to the abortion reform 
a range of states introduced counter-legislations increasing sanctions on illegal abortions 
(Clarke and Mühlrad 2018). These legislation changes came promptly during the years 2008 
and 2009 in 18 of the 31 remaining states besides Mexico City. As these years too fall into the 
observation period of the data analyzed, both the progressive reform in Mexico City as well as 
the regressive policies in other states may impact this paper’s main results. It remains 
impossible to clearly distinguish between impacts driven by SP and the abortion-related 
reforms. In the next section of this chapter I will yet try to suggestively assess the robustness 
of the main results by excluding Mexico City and neighboring states (as it is women residing 
in those states who are most likely to consider travelling to Mexico City in order to get an 
abortion) as well as regressive states respectively.  
 
c. Selective Migration 
 
Another threat to the validity of DD estimates arises when observed groups, control and 
treatment group, change composition over time. If groups do not remain constant it is once 
more the ceteris paribus assumption that may be violated. In the case of the Mexican hospital 
data the outcome is measured on a municipality level. It is hence the municipalities that are 
defined as treated or untreated. Naturally, people will move to other municipalities or other 
states even due to various reasons, considering the long time span the data is covering. If 
these relocations are not linked to the availability of SP this does not present a threat to the 
estimation validity. Yet, if uninsured residents selectively migrate to municipalities which 
already introduced SP in order to obtain coverage, generated estimates will contain bias as 
effects may be due to migration rather actual treatment. Whereas trends may have been 
common across municipalities to begin with, selective migration is non-random and 
correlated with factors impacting trends in home violence, marriages and divorces. Hence, 
changes in group composition potentially violate the common trend assumption.  
 
Conti and Ginja (2017) examine this possible confounder using survey data from the 2010 
CENSUS. They find no evidence that SP lead to selective cross-municipality migration. 
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d. Quality of health care  
 
Up until this point, health care services provided by SP have been assumed to be of identical 
quality as employer-based insurance provided by IMSS, ISSSTE and PEMEX. In other 
words, SP should present a perfect substitute to the other types of available health insurance. 
Yet, this assumption may not hold water in practice. Since the public budget is tight in a 
country like Mexico and due to the high number of potential SP recipients, substantial 
discrepancies in the quality of treatment can be expected (Malkin 2011). Especially in poorer 
municipalities exhibiting a less developed health-related infrastructure the delivered quality of 
services might still be low. José Angel Córdova, serving as Mexico’s Secretariat of Health 
between 2006 and 2012 accordingly admitted that “there is still first-, second- and third-class 
medicine” as late as in 2011 (Malkin 2011). An inferior quality of health services provided by 
SP could be the reason for discovered effects on the examined outcomes being small in scope, 
as treatment is less effective than anticipated. This argument will, as discussed, mostly apply 
to poor municipalities with an especially high share of eligible residents in regards to home 
violence being the outcome of interest. Recapping uncovered effects, it seems hence possible 
that rich municipalities were the driver behind uncovered effects partly because SP did not 
represent a sufficient substitute to employer-based insurance in poor areas. The female outside 
option will consequently not become desirable enough to trigger changes in decision-making 
behavior within the household. When treatment occurs with varying intensity, estimates are 
not directly comparable. It seems therefore reasonable to put more weight on the results for 
the subsample of rich municipalities which had the capacity to provide health services of a 
sufficient quality. It has to be noted that not only the actual quality of health services matters 
in this context, but also the perceived quality as addressed by Finkelstein et al. (2012) 
evaluating the impacts of the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment.   
 
8.2 Specification Checks  
 
In the following section I present regression tables in which the robustness of the main 
specification is assessed in several ways. This is done in order to affirm the validity of the 
effects uncovered in the context of home violence, marriage and divorce.  
 
Firstly, table 8 presents sensitivity analysis results for the main outcome of home violence. 
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Column 1 depicts results of a simple, compact time-to-event specification only accounting for 
municipality and year fixed effects. The second column captures the main results discussed in 
chapter 7. Here, an economy-wide, global time trend as well as a municipality-specific control 
for trends in the age-specific population size are incorporated into the model. These controls 
are accounted for in the remainder of the presented alternative specifications in order to assure 
that the common trend assumption is not violated. Column 3 and 4 address the possibility of 
the 2007 abortion reform in Mexico City confounding the main results. To examine this issue, 
I firstly exclude Mexico City as well as the two neighboring states México and Morelos from 
the sample. The significant effects of SP on home violence in the short and long run remain 
and estimated coefficients for the full and the trimmed sample are not significantly 
distinguishable. Next, states that passed abortion-regressive legislature were dropped from the 
sample in column 4, which reduces the size of the sample from 2341 to 684 municipalities. In 
this case, the impacts of SP almost double in size and even exceed the estimates from the 
model run exclusively for rich municipalities. As this may point to the abortion-related 
reforms having simultaneous impacts which I am not able to precisely disentangle from any 
effects driven by SP, it also points to the existence of male backlash mechanisms. Since 
abortion-regressive states effectively diminished female independence, finding the largest 
impacts in municipalities where no such policy was passed points to increased violence as a 
reaction to women being more empowered.  
 
In column 5, dummy variables indicating the respective number of years since the 
introduction of the poverty alleviation program OP were included in the estimation, following 
the example of Conti and Ginja (2017). This is done in order to ensure that the uncovered 
effects are actually driven by SP and not the forerunner program. Using this alternative 
specification leaves estimated impacts largely unchanged however.  
 
Columns 6 to 8 respectively include linear trends for municipality-specific characteristics in 
regards to labor market, health care and socioeconomic indicators measured at the baseline 
(2000/2001), again following the approach of Conti and Ginja (2017). Column 9 includes all 
of the above. The results are reassuring in a sense that the estimated coefficients remain 
widely unimpacted by the inclusion of the additional controls.  
 
In table 9, the sensitivity of the estimated effects on divorce is tested using similar alternative 
specifications as in table 8. The results follow the same pattern as the ones on home violence. 
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It can however be seen in column (1) that not including trend controls leads to significant 
coefficient estimates pre-SP which implies that the common trend assumption is violated. 
When including variables controlling for trends in the remainder of the regressions run, these 
concerns recede. Whereas estimates in columns (3) and (5) to (9) strongly resemble the one in 
the main specification, impacts increase significantly in size when dropping observations 
from abortion-regressive states. Divorces in states with no or abortion progressive reforms 
(Mexico City) increase in the short run on average by 5 in total numbers compared to 1.4 
(insignificant) for the whole sample. In the long run, 15 additional divorces are filed due to SP 
for the trimmed sample versus approximately 5 when all states are included. Again, this 
points to the underlying assumption of increased female empowerment due to SP being 
reasonable and that backlash effects are a potential mechanism at work.  
 
The same conclusion applies for the marriage-related results shown in table 10. Yet, as the 
estimated effects increase in scope in column (4) when abortion-regressive states are 
excluded, suggesting 15 marriages less short-term and 34 marriages less long-term due to SP 
in a municipality on average, estimates are imprecise and remain insignificant on the 5% 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 9: Discussion  
 
The small, yet significant and explicitly increasing effects of SP on home violence have 
implications on several levels. What is the take away from these results in terms of alternative 
settings? How should the existence of perverse, unintended policy effects influence the design 
of future policy aiming to empower women or tackle home violence? And do these findings 
represent a critique to universal health insurance on a more general level? These are some of 
the questions I will address in this chapter. However, this is done knowing that the presented 
findings add to a limited literature and that effects may be local. In order to be able to make 
statements in regard to the mechanisms behind the occurrence of domestic violence which are 




i. Relevance for other countries  
 
The main findings of this paper imply the existence of unwitting effects of well-intended 
policy. Results point to male backlash effects in Mexico, implying increased male aggressive 
behavior when females become relatively more empowered, in line with the findings of 
Angelucci (2008). However, respective results differ in terms of where within the population 
these effects occur. Whereas Angelucci (2008) discovers backlash effects amongst the poorest 
in her sample, my findings imply backlash effects in rich Mexican municipalities. One aspect 
to consider here is that the respective treatment groups differed to begin with. Whilst the 
analysis by Angelucci (2008) considered those eligible to the poverty alleviation program OP, 
the sample at hand contains both a larger and more heterogeneous pool of individuals, namely 
those eligible to SP.  
 
This paper adds to the existing literature insofar as that it indicates the importance of 
considering perverse backlash effects of empowering policies not only in similar Latin 
American countries but potentially also in more affluent settings. As effects are most distinct 
in rich Mexican municipalities, these impacts may translate into high-income settings. In 
terms of GDP per capita for instance, some of the rich Mexican states with a high share of 
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rich municipalities (according to the marginalization index measured in 2000) are fairly 
comparable to wealthy OECD countries. The state with the by far highest average GDP per 
capita (calculated as the population weighted mean of the GDP per capita of the respective 
municipalities within the state) is Mexico City with around 18,600 adjusted USD in 2000. In 
the second place comes Campeche with round 13,200 adjusted USD per person. Both states 
cover a relatively low number of municipalities in total. Countries with a comparable GDP 
per capita in 2000 include the Czech Republic or Portugal (OECD 2020). The very richest 
municipality located in Mexico City even reaches a GDP per capita which is in the range of 
countries such as Norway or the United States (35,594 USD compared to 36,950 USD in 
Norway and 36,305 USD in the US). This illustrates that presented findings may have 
relevance for high income countries as well. Existing research with data from high-income 
settings generally lacks an element addressing potential heterogeneous effects among 
different groups within the population (e.g. poor vs. rich, highly educated vs. poorly educated 
etc.). Of course, monetary factors are not sufficient in order to argue for external validity. It 
has to be acknowledged that cultural factors elaborated upon in chapter 2 may play a major 
role in the existence of uncovered effects. However, mentioned arguments call for more 
comprehensive and detailed research especially set in high-income countries in order to 
understand underlying mechanisms at play better.  
 
ii. Relevance in terms of health insurance 
 
This paper focusses on a set of indirect impacts of the health care program SP in Mexico. 
Uncovered effects are small but may be important to consider on a broader level. However, 
the main takeaway of these findings should be tied to intra-household mechanisms at work 
when violent behavior occurs rather than a critique of expanding the public health sector per 
se. As universal health insurance is for the most part perceived as a desirable good within 
society, it is important to understand that well-intended policies can trigger perverse effects. 
To e.g. exclusively consider potential health benefits due to universal health insurance misses 
other effects such policy may trigger as not everything else remains equal in real world 
scenarios such as the introduction of SP. 
 
Emerging economies focus increasingly on expanding the public health sector, following the 
call from economists from all over the world (Summers 2015). In its efforts to improve 
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affordable high-quality access to care for everyone, China quadrupled health care funding 
between 2008 and 2017 (The Lancet 2019). Many Latin American countries more similar to 
Mexico followed a similar strategy. Implementing a health care reform (Seguro Integral de 
Salud, hereafter SIS) that has many similarities to SP in 2001, Peru achieved coverage for the 
most vulnerable groups within its society. In 2011, SIS protected 45% of the Peruvian 
population against health-related adverse shocks, making it the main provider of health 
insurance within the country (Bernal, Carpio, and Klein 2017).  
 
One of the most prominent reforms in health care leads us to a special case amongst the 
Western countries, namely the US. Generally in the US, there exists a fair share of people, 
often conservatives, criticizing universally designed health care plans (Thaler and Sunstein 
2019). The main argument in these cases is in accordance with the principle of free markets 
and indicates that people should be able to choose freely according to their preferences to 
reach efficient allocations of resources. This implies that each individual is acting as a homo 
economicus20. The market for health insurance is yet imperfect due to e.g. asymmetric 
information and adverse selection and it has been empirically shown for the case of 
Medicare21 that the majority of people actually make poor decisions choosing their respective 
individual health plan themselves. McFadden (2006) provides evidence that almost two thirds 
of Medicare users did not manage to minimize the expected present value of their out-of-
pocket expenses. Also, it has been shown that publicly provided health care (in this case 
Medicaid) has the potential to improve objective health outcomes such as child mortality 
(Goodman-Bacon 2018). Nonetheless, the fear of being paternalized by the government and 
the skepticism of publicly provided health care persists in the US-American society.  
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA, also referred to as “Obamacare”) 
was initiated by the Obama administration and signed in 2010, aiming to extend coverage to 
uninsured US citizens with both private and public insurance (National Conference of State 
Legislatures 2011). Even though the PPACA requires employers to provide insurance to 
 
20
 The expression homo economicus refers to a fully rational agent who acts in order to maximize utility and is 
capable of making weighed decisions.  
21 Medicare is the federal health insurance program first introduced in 1965 in the US, offering coverage for 
seniors aged 65 years or older as well as younger people with certain disabilities or permanent kidney failure. 
The scheme consists of several parts addressing hospital and medical insurance as well as prescription drug 
coverage (U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 2020b). Thaler and Sunstein (2019) discuss 
Medicare’s Part D (prescription drug coverage scheme) which was enacted in 2003 under the Bush 
administration. Part D offers a range of different packages to the eligible to choose from, which leaves them with 
the freedom of choice but also introduces challenges in terms of information and guidance.  
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employees and individuals to obtain insurance themselves, both with some exceptions, there 
still exists a significant amount of uninsured US citizens. After a large decrease in the number 
of uninsured following PPACA, over 30 million people remained without coverage in 2018, 
which accounts for a little less than one tenth of the total population (Statista 2020). This 
comparatively high share can at least in part be traced back to described patterns of 
libertarianism within society. Again, the underlying free market positive argument hinges on 
perfectly competitive markets. Since this assumption is violated in the case of health 
insurance provision, unregulated markets may lead to an undersupply, making government 
intervention justifiable. The case of the US is an interesting one however, as the health care 
system is dysfunctional and still unaffordable for many. An interesting example for this is the 
Surgery Center of Oklahoma, a health facility located in Oklahoma City that is cash-based, 
skipping insurance companies as the middle man between patient and doctor. The Surgery 
Center was able to cut costs for surgical procedures tremendously (Roberts 2019). As the 
PPACA is under constant scrutiny, in large part by Republicans, some experts expect the free 
market health care system to gain popularity nationwide within the US (Sweetland Edwards 
2017). Even though the US are a very special case in respect to health insurance, this 
exemplifies that there exist different approaches to health care provision and room for 
discussion. Yet, as a free market health care approach may work very well for many, it poses 
the threat of making the poorest worse off and increasing marginalization. As adverse shocks 
can be linked to increases in home violence (see e.g. Schneider, Harknett, and McLanahan 
2016), UHI ensures that especially disadvantaged people have a system to fall back when an 
event such as the current crisis surrounding the COVID-19 virus occurs. Therefore, it may be 
reasonable to assume that the small increasing ITT effects discovered do not weigh heavy in 
comparison.  
 
iii. Relevance in terms of policies targeting domestic violence  
 
The findings of this paper imply perverse effects on home violence as a consequence of policy 
which indirectly empowers women. Given a setting with similar external circumstances as in 
the Mexican sample, such possible effects have to be taken into consideration. As direct 
measures that aim to tackle home violence mostly exhibit empowering components, policy 
may not only fail to have the intended effects, but make some victims worse off. Alternative 
strategies that avoid such risks might be increasing penalties for perpetrators as well as 
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finding ways to make uncovering domestic violence or reporting of incidents easier. 
 
In order to be able to design optimal policy, the determinants of such backlash effects have to 
be canvassed in more detail. This craves more comprehensive research in this field.  
 
9.2 Recent developments  
 
As the main results of this paper address a pressing issue and contribute to both existing SP-
related literature and economic domestic violence research, the health insurance program 
itself was not long-lived. Tough cost cutting measures by the in 2018 elected president Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador (often referred to as AMLO by the media) hit the public sector, 
including hospitals and health centers (Sheridan 2019). Stating that Mexicans “can’t have a 
rich government in a poor country” AMLO is said to have also cut his own salary by 60% 
(Busby 2018, Sheridan 2019). Yet, it seems to be exactly these austerity measures that hurt 
the poor the worst in some respects. The director of the public children’s hospital in Mexico 
City stated in the spring of 2019 that he was faced with having to let go staff and that the lack 
of financial means led to the postponing of operations and tests for sick patients, calling the 
current circumstances inhumane (Sheridan 2019). Already before AMLO’s presidency, some 
uttered criticism about the implementation of SP. Even though universal health care coverage 
was promised, the tight budget constraints considering the high number of insured allegedly 
lead to substantial discrepancies in the quality of treatment (Malkin 2011). 
In December 2018, AMLO announced that the failing of SP was evident, “que ni es seguro ni 
es popular” (as it was neither insurance nor for the people) (El Financiero 2018). During the 
summer of 2019, AMLO’s plans of a new, integrated federal system began to take shape. In 
January of 2020, the Institute of Health for Welfare (Insituto de Salud para el Bienestar – 
INSABI) was established, gradually replacing SP. Whilst covering everyone not insured via 
an employer, in contrast to SP, INSABI does not require enrolment or any form of co-
payment and promised to offer free access to all medicines (The Yucatan Times 2019). As 
this sounds auspicious, criticism was voiced by i.a. the former secretary of Health of Mexico 
and president of the University of Miami, Julio Frenk. Frenk forecasts that the proposed 
system will not live up to its promise as the available budget is too small, the design is hasty, 
not well thought-through and the unilateral structure of the system is outdated (Moreno 2020). 
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Especially the current COVID-19 crisis will put INSABI to a test almost instantly after its 
introduction.  
Chapter 10: Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify possible impacts of the health insurance program 
Seguro Popular (SP) on the occurrence of domestic violence in Mexico. Employing a DD 
estimation strategy which exploits the quasi-exogenous variation of the SP rollout on a 
municipality level, I estimate impacts on home violence for both the shorter and longer run. 
My findings imply small, yet significant ITT effects that point to increases of violence due to 
the health insurance program. While treatment triggers heterogeneous effects among the poor 
and rich municipalities, SP is estimated to increase the number of home violence incidents by 
0.05 up to two years and by 0.1 after three or more years after introduction per municipality 
overall. In line with previous evidence from developing and threshold countries this suggests 
perverse effects of well-intended policy and corresponds with the theory of male backlash. It 
has to be acknowledged that uncovered impacts are small in size, even when considering the 
fact that they represent ITT effects. One should thus apply caution when qualitatively 
interpreting these results, as solely focusing on statistical significance, ignoring effect size and 
other factors of relevance, will not produce scientifically valuable conclusions (McCloskey 
and Ziliak 2010). 
 
Addressing the robustness and validity of my findings, I presented evidence suggesting that 
the common trend assumption cannot be rejected. Also, estimated coefficients are robust to a 
range of alternative specification. Yet, as I examine a relatively long time-span with 
potentially many unobserved confounders one has to remain cautious interpreting estimates as 
causal impacts. Incorporating policy changes in 2007-2009 related to pregnancy interruption 
illustrates that impacts of different policies implemented simultaneously cannot be 
disentangled. This is a reoccurring challenge using DD estimation strategies as other factors 
that impact the outcome, besides the actual treatment, are not necessarily constant. Also, the 
validity of the presented results hinges on the correct identification of domestic violence 
victims in the hospital data. Hospital admitted home violence victims represent a subgroup 
and results may not reflect impacts for the whole population of abused women but local 
effects due to selection.  
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The fact that all coefficient estimates point to increases in home violence adds credibility in 
regards to the direction of the effect of SP. A complementary analysis illustrating how women 
became more empowered and independent when SP was introduced using divorce and 
marriage rates underpin the underlying mechanism of SP impacting household dynamics.  
 
The probable existence of undesirable effects of measures empowering women could have 
implications for the optimal design of policy targeting home violence. To be able to specify 
this in more detail, the determinants of backlash effects have to be more closely examined. As 
male backlash impacts have empirically mostly been found in relatively poor, socially 
conservative countries in the past, I find effects to be driven by rich municipalities. This could 
point to a certain relevance of the presented findings for higher-income countries. 
Nonetheless, more comprehensive research is needed in this respect. Especially for Western 
countries, research does usually fail to consider potential heterogeneous impacts across the 
population. To be able to address the growing and pressing issue of home violence against 
women the cultural and social determinants of male backlash behavior have to become one 
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Table A1: Effects of SP on alternatively identified domestic violence incidents (compact time-to-event 
specification excluding trend controls) 


















(inclusive) SP (β1) (0.0240) (0.0111) (0.0483) 
    
0 to 2 years  0.0832*** 0.0276* 0.114** 
after SP (β2) (0.0228) (0.0108) (0.0423) 
    
3 or more years  0.211*** 0.0821*** 0.273** 
after SP (β3) (0.0501) (0.0213) (0.0950) 
    
Year & Mun. FE X X X 
    
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.0001 0.0006 0.0151 










Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on the alternative specification of 
home violence employing a compact time-to-event specification. Effects are estimated for all municipalities in column (1) as 
well as separately for the poor and rich municipalities in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The dependent variable is the total 
count of domestic violence incidents per municipality per year (2000-2012). Presented estimates follow a DD estimation 
strategy with all specifications including year and municipality FE. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
municipality level.  






















Table A2: Effects of SP on alternatively identified domestic violence incidents (compact time-to-event 
specification including trend controls) 


















(inclusive) SP (β1) (0.0206) (0.0108) (0.0416) 
    
0 to 2 years  0.107*** 0.0324** 0.141** 
after SP (β2) (0.0238) (0.0110) (0.0442) 
    
3 or more years  0.235*** 0.0737*** 0.307** 
after SP (β3) (0.0522) (0.0211) (0.0992) 
    
Year & Mun. FE X X X 
    
Trend Controls X X X 
    
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.0000 0.0013 0.0053 










Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on the alternative specification of 
home violence employing a compact time-to-event specification. Effects are estimated for all municipalities in column (1) as 
well as separately for the poor and rich municipalities in columns (2) and (3) respectively. The dependent variable is the total 
count of domestic violence incidents per municipality per year (2000-2012). Presented estimates follow a DD estimation 
strategy with all specifications including year and municipality FE as well as controls for both an economy-wide trend in the 
outcome and trends in the municipality-specific population size for residents aged 20-40 years to ensure that the common 
trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the municipality level.  





















Table A3: Effects of SP on household composition in poor municipalities (compact time-to-event 
specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 “Marrying up” 
 in age 
Unemployed 
Female 













before (incl.) SP (β1) (0.00484) (0.00444) (0.0585) (0.00464) 
     
0 to 2 years  -0.000836 -0.00508 0.0225 -0.00124 
after SP (β2) (0.00459) (0.00447) (0.0577) (0.00435) 
     
3 or more years  0.000940 -0.00431 -0.0411 -0.00262 
after SP (β3) (0.00686) (0.00669) (0.0935) (0.00650) 
     
Year & Mun. FE X X X X 
Trend Controls X X X X 
     
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.9110 0.4860 0.4446 0.9211 












Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on the composition of newly married 
couples in poor municipalities employing a compact time-to-event specification. Four outcomes of interest are considered: 
(1) the percentage of women marrying older men, (2) the percentage of unemployed women married employed men, (3) the 
age gap between partners measured in full years, given the female is younger than the male and (4) the education gap, defined 
as a dummy indicator taking value 1 when the man is the more educated one in the relationship, between male and female. 
Presented estimates follow a DD estimation strategy with all specifications including year and municipality FE as well as 
controls for both an economy-wide trend in the outcome and trends in the municipality-specific population size for residents 
aged 15-64 years to ensure that the common trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
municipality level.  





















Table A4: Effects of SP on household composition in rich municipalities (compact time-to-event 
specification) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 “Marrying up” 
 in age 
Unemployed  
Female 
Age Gap Education  
Gap  
 









before (incl.) SP (β1) (0.00366) (0.00408) (0.0496) (0.00330) 
     
0 to 2 years  0.00198 -0.0111* 0.102* 0.00103 
after SP (β2) (0.00325) (0.00467) (0.0432) (0.00304) 
     
3 or more years  -0.00136 -0.00287 0.245** 0.00356 
after SP (β3) (0.00471) (0.00651) (0.0894) (0.00467) 
     
Year & Mun. FE  X X X X 
     
Trend Controls X X X X 
     
p-value H0: 
β2 = β3 = 0 
0.4394 0.0026 0.0235 0.6985 












Note: This table displays least square estimates of the short and long run impact of SP on the composition of newly married 
couples in rich municipalities employing a compact time-to-event specification. Four outcomes of interest are considered: (1) 
the percentage of women marrying older men, (2) the percentage of unemployed women married employed men, (3) the age 
gap between partners measured in full years, given the female is younger than the male and (4) the education gap, defined as 
a dummy indicator taking value 1 when the man is the more educated one in the relationship, between male and female. 
Presented estimates follow a DD estimation strategy with all specifications including year and municipality FE as well as 
controls for both an economy-wide trend in the outcome and trends in the municipality-specific population size for residents 
aged 15-64 years to ensure that the common trend assumption is met. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 
municipality level.  
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